The Obama administration's policy to allow work permits for some students whose parents came to the U.S. illegally may have little direct impact on higher education, but colleges are helping students pursue the new status.
At celebration of land-grant universities, Bill Gates and others tell campus leaders they must use financial aid and new technology to maintain the Morrill Act's emphasis on student access and agricultural education.
This month, Vice President Joe Biden led a round-table discussion with a group of college and university presidents from some of our nation’s largest institutions of higher education. The outcome of that meeting was an agreement by the leaders of 10 institutions or higher education systems to include a standardized “shopping sheet” in the financial aid packets sent to incoming students, beginning in the fall of 2013. A sample of the “shopping sheet,” which is designed to provide information relating to college costs, student indebtedness, and likelihood of degree completion, can be found here.
Though I recognize the alarming increase in college costs that has occurred during the last 15 years, and I applaud any honest effort to address this problem, I fear the “shopping sheet” fails to break new ground.
Transparency is a good thing, and students/parents should know what to expect when they select a college. The problems with the “shopping sheet,” however, are threefold.
First, this seems to be an attempt to repackage something that many colleges and universities are already doing. The College Portrait’s Voluntary System of Accountability (VSA) provides a more detailed and nuanced collection of pertinent information for those considering their college options. It includes costs related to tuition and fees, a personalized estimation of financial aid and loans, as well as details and data concerning admissions, campus life, student experiences/outcomes, and much more. The VSA is easy to navigate and also allows for comparison of institutions. Hundreds of colleges and universities are already participating in the VSA, and expansion of that number would be a positive step. Given the existence of the VSA, introduction of the “shopping sheet” seems a bit redundant and doesn’t offer any solution to the cost issue.
Second, the “shopping sheet” fails to address one of the hidden issues in the college-cost discussion -- time to degree. As I have discussed in the past, graduating on time dramatically reduces the total cost of college and increases one’s lifetime earning potential. Though the “shopping sheet” provides a snapshot of institutional and average 4-year graduation rates as well as student retention rates, this information is not sufficient for understanding the total cost/value proposition of attending a college. The College of New Jersey, where I serve as president, is one of only six public colleges and universities nationally that maintain 4-year graduation rates greater than 70 percent.
The reality is that most college students now take longer than 4 years to complete their degrees, or do not graduate at all. That makes 6-year graduation rates, which are included in the VSA but omitted from the “shopping sheet,” an important statistic for consideration. Other vital outcomes, such as post-graduate employment information, graduate school admission rates, and professional license or certification exam passage rates, are published on TCNJ’s admissions web site and in other locations. These data points can be very informative during the college-selection process but are currently overlooked by both the “shopping sheet” and the VSA. Inclusion of that information would be a strong enhancement.
Third, doing this sort of reporting through the “shopping sheet” or VSA or some other government-imposed mechanism, whether state or federal, forces colleges and universities to expend resources. The information provided in these reports can be very useful, but it does not get aggregated or analyzed unless you hire staff to do that work. That’s appropriate, if the expenditures improve educational quality or help increase effectiveness. Unfortunately, though collecting data and issuing reports may illustrate the cost problem, those actions will not solve the problem.
In order to actually address the college-cost issue, institutions must operate strategically and efficiently. They must manage course offerings in ways that optimize the deployment faculty and staff, facilitate the attainment of learning outcomes, and provide students with access to the courses they need for timely degree completion. Institutions also must offer support services that undergird the academic experience, eliminate roadblocks, and enhance the prospects of students graduating on time. Therefore, neither institutions nor their students can afford unnecessary redundancy in the name of political one-upmanship.
I think we can all agree that colleges and universities should be open and honest with prospective students about the actual cost of attaining a degree, not just enrolling for a year. Providing information that allows for simple, accurate comparison of institutions is a worthwhile goal, but I believe adding a few data points to the VSA would be a better strategy than implementing the “shopping sheet.” It’s important to remember, though, that talking about and reporting on our affordability problem is not enough; we need to find ways to solve it.
R. Barbara Gitenstein is president of the College of New Jersey.
A no-cost solution to the impasse on extending the 3.4 percent interest rate on some federal student loans is hiding in plain sight.
Lawmakers can cut interest rates and lower student debt burdens at no taxpayer cost starting with the upcoming school year by pegging interest rates to those on 10-year Treasury bonds, plus 3.0 percentage points. This policy is better for all students, even those who would qualify for the 3.4 percent interest rate. Yet, in a show of election-year theatrics, lawmakers are deadlocked over how to offset the $6 billion cost of extending the 3.4 percent rate -- raise taxes or repeal part of the 2010 health care law -- and aren’t looking for what helps students most.
Why is Congress debating interest rates on student loans in the first place?
Since 2006, the Department of Education has issued most federal student loans (Unsubsidized Stafford loans) with a fixed 6.8 percent interest rate. In recent years, however, Congress has allowed undergraduates with greater financial need to get lower rates on Subsidized Stafford loans. Funding has now dried up for those lower rates -- which hit 3.4 percent last school year -- so all newly issued loans starting this school year will carry the 6.8 percent rate. That is, unless Congress comes up with more funding. So it is now a “how do you pay for it?” debate that is going nowhere.
Congress and the president should just call a truce and agree instead to peg the rate on all newly-issued loans (for graduate and undergraduates) to 10-year Treasury bonds, plus 3.0 percentage points. The Congressional Budget Office says this plan (which was introduced as a Senate bill on Wednesday) reduces the cost of the loan program by $52 billion over 10 years because the agency estimates that rates on 10-year Treasury notes will eventually rise and newly issued loans will carry rates higher than 6.8 percent.
Students would be better off under this plan than what Congress is currently debating. That is true even though the formula doesn’t get the rate on Subsidized Stafford loans down to 3.4 percent (at today’s 10-year Treasury rate it would be 4.5 percent). While Congress and the president have been focused on the seemingly magical number of 3.4 percent for Subsidized Stafford loans, they’ve overlooked the fact that a smaller rate cut applied to both Subsidized and Unsubsidized Stafford loans adds up to a better deal for borrowers. Here’s why.
Undergraduate students (who are still dependents) can borrow up to $5,500 in Unsubsidized Stafford loans their first year in school, $6,500 in the second, and up to $7,500 each year thereafter. However, Subsidized Stafford loans, those that qualify for the 3.4 percent interest rate, max out $2,000 below those annual limits. So undergraduates who qualify for the lower rate, but borrow the maximum in total federal loans, actually have both types of loans.
Under the proposed extension of the 3.4 percent rate, one loan would charge 3.4 percent interest and the other 6.8 percent. Under the 10-year Treasury note proposal, rates on both loans would be the same, at 4.5 percent based on today’s rates.
While the weighted average interest rates a student will pay under either plan are very close, the 10-year Treasury plan is more favorable because Unsubsidized Stafford loans accrue interest annually while a borrower is in school. (No interest accrues on Subsidized Stafford loans during that time.) As a result, lowering that rate on both loan types to 4.5 percent, as the 10-year Treasury note plan would do, means borrowers would leave school with lower overall loan balances than they would under current law or the pending proposals to extend the 3.4 percent interest rate on some loans.
For example, a first year student’s loan balance upon graduating four years later would be $6,044 under the proposed extension of the 3.4 percent rate. But under the 10-year Treasury note plan, it would drop to $5,860 because the Unsubsidized Stafford portion of the loan balance accrues interest at the lower rate of 4.5 percent while the student is in school. Therefore, the student’s monthly payment would be $3 lower under the 10-year note plan than if he were to take out a Subsidized Stafford loan at 3.4 percent.
Graduate students and undergraduate borrowers who don’t qualify for any of the loans at 3.4 percent also would realize savings under the 10-year Treasury note plan because they would pay lower rates, too. Parent and Graduate PLUS loans rates would be lower as well.
So far Congress and student advocates haven’t warmed to this alternative, despite its clear benefits. Some would-be supporters are concerned that pegging fixed rates to the 10-year Treasury note would mean that rates on new loans could eventually be higher than 4.5 percent or even 6.8 percent. There is certainly a risk of that happening, but that’s the only way to reduce the cost of the loan program in the long run while lowering interest rates in the short run.
Besides, there is merit to pegging rates to a market index. Students will get lower rates when the economy is weak and will pay higher rates only if the economy improves. That’s a fair approach, for both taxpayers and students.
If only Congress would look past the politically charged 3.4 percent interest rate, they would see that a better plan for reducing student debt is right in front of them.
Jason Delisle is director of the Federal Education Budget Project at the New America Foundation.
Over the last four decades, federal and state policy makers have wrestled with how to design student aid programs to make them fair, efficient, and effective – and how to evaluate and improve those programs, once in place.
Early on it was discovered that competing interests could easily overtake and dominate the policy formulation process. Unsupported claims that programs were inefficient, poorly targeted, or unfairly favored one type of student or institution over another were not uncommon. Even proposals that appeared to alter the intent of the program, disenfranchise a whole class of students, or undermine a particular type of institution were offered with no accompanying data analysis. Often developed behind closed doors, such proposals gave little consideration to the impact of the proposed change on the enrollment, persistence, and completion behavior of affected students.
Over two decades ago, in an attempt to improve the policymaking process, a group of analysts in Washington put in place a nonpartisan, analytical framework to ensure that policymakers could understand the exact nature and likely impact of alternative proposals. The framework involved an agreement to use a standard computer model with known assumptions and populated with the best and most recent data. The model produced standard output when alternative program specifications were entered, such as changes in the maximum award, level of tuition sensitivity of the award, expected family contribution, and other program algorithms.
The output was a standard table that displayed the resulting changes in cells. A simplified version looked something like this:
Impact of Proposal on Students and Institutions
Type and Control of College
Data Arrayed in Each Cell
Number of Recipients
Level of Program Funds
Share of Program Funds
Average Award of Dependent and Independent Students
The rows of the table (displayed on the left) represented levels of family income; the columns denoted institutions of different type, control, and cost of attendance. For example, cell A included the lowest-income recipients attending 2-year public colleges, cell B included their middle-income peers who attended 4-year public colleges, and cell C included their high-income peers who attended 4-year private colleges.
The bottom row contained program funds received, by type and control of institution. For example, cell D showed total program funds going to all other postsecondary institutions, and cell E showed total program costs. The remaining cells showed other combinations.
Within each cell (displayed on the right), the computer output would array the following data: number of recipients; level of program funds; share of program funds; and average award for dependent and independent students. Once this table was produced for the current programs, proposed changes could be entered into the model to produce a new table, for purposes of comparison to the benchmark table -- the status quo.
Proposals that did not significantly change the existing distribution of program funds, by family income and type of institution, as measured by the shares in the cells, were deemed neutral. Proposals that redistributed program funds toward the northwest portion of the table, that is, toward cell A, were deemed relatively consistent with program intent by most observers; while those that moved funds generally to the southeast portion of the table, toward Cell C, not so much. Even the most challenged participants got the hang of the exercise quickly.
The benefits of obtaining unanimous agreement to use this framework in the policy formulation process were profound. For each alternative proposal, policymakers had at their disposal: any and all changes made to the underlying demographic assumptions of the model; the complete set of all proposed program changes; and the impact on students, institutions, and taxpayers of implementing the changes. One major benefit of using the framework was minimizing, if not wholly excluding, obviously self-serving proposals that ran counter to any reasonable interpretation of program intent. Occasionally, however, such a proposal would slip through, to the great amusement of n-1 participants. (Wow, you really hate community college students, don’t you?)
Use of the framework had another really important advantage. Advocacy (nothing wrong with that!) could be quickly distinguished from analysis. Advocates, analysts, and the all-too-familiar hybrids, who wear multiple hats, had the same information. There was an even playing field with everyone’s cards in full sight on the table. When used to identify and compare equal cost options that held total funding constant and redistributed different shares to participants, a sometimes unsettling zero-sum game unfolded in which losses had to finance gains.
Lively discussions ensued. Some had to be taken outside.
It is important to note that the framework did not provide estimates of the likely impact on student outcomes, that is, actual changes in enrollment and persistence behavior. At the time, there were no reliable data to build into the model that predicted student behavior – particularly any induced positive or negative enrollment effects of the proposal.
But this early effort to standardize at least the analytical portion of the policy process was a resounding success. Because, without these first-order estimates, winners and losers under proposed changes could not be identified, much less educated guesses made about how students might actually behave in response.
As another round of Higher Education Act reauthorization approaches, the higher education policy community, more than ever, needs to develop a similar analytical framework, underpinned by a more sophisticated computer model, driven by far richer data, containing more grant programs – federal, state, and institutional. Creating such a framework would not be all that difficult, the returns would again be enormous, and the data are available.
The table would display students, by family income and dependency, and all institutions, by type, control, and cost of attendance. Separate tables could be created at the program, institutional, state, and national level.
The effort should start with simple questions: What information should be displayed in the cells? Certainly it should include at least those in the simple table above. Should dependent and independent recipients be treated separately? Yes. Should merit-based grants be included? Probably. How about nontraditional students? Of course. You get the idea.
Given today’s budget battles, momentous zero-sum decisions that hold program funding constant will be made at the federal and state level – decisions that will dramatically affect the enrollment and persistence decisions of low- and middle-income students, and institutions as well. Without an agreed-upon framework with which to compare alternative proposals, at least as to who gains and who loses, policy discussions will proceed unproductively as if policymakers were starting from scratch, when, in fact, they are not. Without such a framework, discussions will fail to take properly into account the sobering reality that there are already programs in place that students, parents, and institutions count on, and that changes in existing programs will not only add to complexity and confusion but also have important tradeoffs and consequences.
Building the analytical framework should start now with the Pell Grant program. Given its central importance to millions of students and thousands of institutions, all legislative proposals to modify or alter the program should be specified and evaluated using an up-to-date version of a standard computer model that all stakeholders, including students, can use – a model that includes a common set of inputs and outputs. This is particularly important in the case of proposed changes that would condition the Pell award on the basis of data not currently collected and used in the calculation of award, expected family contribution, or student and institutional eligibility.
Examples include making the Pell award conditional on measures of merit or progress. In such cases, the source of the data must be specified, a new parameter created, and the impact of making the award conditional on that parameter estimated using the model. Winnings must be balanced with losses, and educated guesses must at least be considered about what will likely happen to students affected by the proposed change – particularly those who would lose much needed grant aid if the change were incorporated in the program.
Perhaps most important, proposals whose cost and distributional analyses appear acceptable should be subjected to rigorous case-controlled testing with additional funds – holding students harmless – before implementation. Congress, the Administration, and state legislatures will certainly need this information to make decisions because redistributing a fixed amount of scarce need-based grant aid to meet national and state access and completion goals, while minimizing unintended harm to students and institutions, will be challenging.
Without the light that good data and analysis can shed on the effort, policymakers will again be dancing in the dark.
Bill Goggin is executive director of the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, an independent committee created by Congress in the Education Amendments of 1986 to provide technical, nonpartisan advice on student aid policy.
Of late, American higher education has been suffering more than its share of the shocks that flesh is heir to. As a result, we will likely see soon a retrenchment in government-subsidized student loans.
First, the alarm has gone out following the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s latest study of student-loan debt. In addition to finding that student debt now exceeds $1 trillion, exceeding credit-card debt, the study found that senior citizens are bearing an ever-greater burden of student loans.
Surprised to read “senior citizens” in the same sentence as “student loans”? The study found that fully 18 percent of delinquent student-loan debt now rests on the slumping shoulders of those 50 and older. Parents increasingly are taking out loans to help their children through college. These late-life excursions into debt threaten parents’ retirement prospects, producing the “possibility of another major threat on par with the devastating home mortgage crisis,” says a recent report by the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys.
With this gloomy prediction, Chase, America’s largest bank, appears to agree. Chase just announced that it will stop providing student loans to those who are not its customers. Bad student-loan debt at the bank has increased 72 percent since 2009. So in a move unnervingly reminiscent of the buildup to the housing-market meltdown, Chase Bank has opted to cuts its losses.
But will those ultimately on the hook for these unpaid, government-subsidized loans -- the American taxpayers -- likewise be able to cut their losses? Not according to Vice President Joe Biden.
The vice president took part recently in a Twitter town hall, at which he was asked, "Have you ever thought about lowering education costs by decreasing the role of government intervention in the education business?" His Twittered response conceded that reducing government subsidies “could reduce [tuition] costs.”
Biden’s concession is noteworthy. Generally, defenders of these loans have been loath to admit that the resulting distortion of market forces escalates precipitously both prices and debt in the same manner and for the same reason as occurred in the home-mortgage industry.
But Biden’s extraordinary concession immediately gave way to an ordinary dodge. Even allowing that reducing government intervention could lower tuition costs, it would be “against [the] national interest to do so,” he tweeted, because fewer students would then be able to attend college, cheaper though it may become.
According to the vice president, then, the trillion dollars of loan debt, the rising defaults on these loans, and the skyrocketing tuition prices (average tuition has risen four times faster than inflation over the past quarter-century) are all worth it. They are the price for increased access to a college degree. Refusing to pay this higher price would be “against the national interest.”
Give the vice president credit for honesty. The question then becomes, “What exactly are we taxpayers getting for the increased price he wants us to continue to pay?”
According to Academically Adrift, last year’s landmark national study of collegiate learning, the answer is “not very much.” Of the national sample of students it surveyed, 45 percent failed to show “any significant improvement” in “critical thinking, complex reasoning, and writing skills (i.e., general collegiate skills)” after two years in college. Even after four years in college, 36 percent continued to show only insignificant improvement.
The disappointment produced by these results magnifies when we consider the cost of the drive for greater access. Today, about half of the students who enter college graduate. Of this half, Adrift tells us, only two out of three succeed at demonstrating some substantial learning. In all, then, only one in three college-headed students leaves with both a degree and the learning a degree is meant to certify.
For this sad outcome, Americans are footing an unsustainable debt burden. The vice president urges that we stay the course nonetheless. Will his countrymen follow him, or will they make like Chase Bank and exit before the bubble bursts? Would growing numbers begin to abandon the quest for a college degree?
This is hard to imagine when for decades we have been told, and with some truth, that a college education is the alpha and the omega. Consensus regarding the value of a degree has served to justify the upward spiral of government subsidies, tuition prices, and student-loan debt. But Chase Bank’s move is only the latest bit of evidence that, for some time now, the benefits of college are plummeting proportionately as tuition prices and loan-debt soar.
Nevertheless, Americans, at least for the short term, likely will continue to borrow for college as long as government-subsidized loans are available. But the short term may prove to be very short.
If we continue on the course urged by the vice president, loan defaults will continue to rise, which means that the bill to the federal government, which guarantees the loans, will continue to rise. The increased dollars required to foot this bill can come only through raising taxes, or cutting funding for other programs, or government borrowing. In a still-stagnant economy, raising taxes is knotty. Cutting other programs has rarely been an option for which our national leaders have shown much stomach, as it creates only a new class of aggrieved constituents. Equally problematic is increasing government borrowing when the deficit and national debt already stand at historic highs.
What seems likely, regardless of who wins the November elections, is a cutback in government-subsidized student loans. It seems that as Chase goes, so eventually must go the federal government. As the federal spigot closes, so will be the number of students able to attend college, at least initially. But the resulting downward pressure on demand will force universities to reduce prices, restoring market equilibrium in time.
How and when this will transpire is a matter for speculation, but may be explained reasonably, and not without humor, by what is known in investment circles as the “greater fool theory.” According to this theory, market bubbles are caused by overly cheery investors (“fools”) who buy overvalued products believing that they will be able to sell them at a profit to other (“greater”) fools. The bubble stays intact so long as greater fools are available to prop up the market. The bubble bursts when there are no greater fools left. At this point, the last greater fool finds that he is in fact the “greatest fool.”
Mr. Biden’s critics charge him with betting that there are still fools out there (students, parents, and taxpayers) who will continue to invest in the overvalued asset higher education has become. However, a bubble requires more than the credulousness of fools. It also requires that they be solvent. Collective foolishness has driven the country to brink of insolvency, leaving even the foolish among us with no option save self-restraint. As the maxim has it, “The wise man does at once what the fool does at last.” In higher education, the country may be poised finally to do the right thing, having exhausted all other alternatives.
Thomas K. Lindsay directs the Center for Higher Education at the Texas Public Policy Foundation. He served as deputy chairman and COO of the National Endowment for the Humanities during George Bush’s second term.