News, Views and Careers for All of Higher Education
May 31, 2006
A divided U.S. Supreme Court severely narrowed the free speech rights of government employees in a ruling Tuesday in a whistle blower case. In doing so, the court touched on but largely sidestepped the question of whether the restrictive standard applies to employees of public colleges, in a way that concerned some proponents of academic freedom but heartened others.
Tuesday’s ruling came in a case, Garcetti v. Ceballos (04-473), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had largely upheld the longstanding view that when public employees made statements about “matters of public concern” in their official capacities, they were protected by the First Amendment. But the Supreme Court’s decision to take the case of Richard Ceballos, a Los Angeles deputy district attorney who was demoted and transferred after criticizing a local sheriff’s conduct to his supervisors, had led many observers to suggest that the court intended to reconsider that precedent.
Indeed, that’s what happened Tuesday, in a case that was first argued before Justice Sandra Day O’Connor retired but not resolved before she left. It was then reheard in March after Justice Samuel A. Alito joined the court, which prompted speculation that the remaining justices had been evenly divided. Tuesday’s 5 to 4 ruling, which was written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, with dissenting opinions by Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer, bore out that speculation, as Alito cast the deciding vote.
“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline,” Kennedy wrote in the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr., Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
Kennedy added: “Ceballos did not act as a citizen when he went about conducting his daily professional activities, such as supervising attorneys, investigating charges, and preparing filings. In the same way he did not speak as a citizen by writing a memo that addressed the proper disposition of a pending criminal case. When he went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government employee. The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance.”
As the Supreme Court prepared to hear the Ceballos case last year, several academic groups filed a friend of the court brief in which they expressed concern that undermining the protection of a public employee’s work-related speech would undercut the federal courts’ traditional deference to academic freedom. “The most valuable contributions that most university scholars and teachers make to public debate and understanding typically derive from their academic disciplines or fields of expertise,” the American Association of University Professors and the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of the First Amendment said in their brief. “Thus, any suggestion that ‘matters of public concern’ many not encompass job-related expression of professors would undermine the special protections the Court has given academic freedom for the past 50 years.”
In his dissent Tuesday, Justice Souter said that the majority’s stance could do just that. What the majority considers to be “beyond the pale of the First Amendment,” Souter writes, “is spacious enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor, and I have to hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil the First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to official duties.’” Souter draws the latter part of that quotation from the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in a University of Michigan affirmative action case, one in a long line of cases that expressed the court’s commitment to “safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendant value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned,” as the court put it in a 1967 case involving the State University of New York.
Kennedy’s opinion contained a response to Souter’s half-statement, half-question about the potential threat to academic freedom. “Justice Souter suggests today’s decision may have important ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a constitutional value,” Kennedy wrote. “There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”
Legal scholars and experts on academic freedom read the exchange between Souter and Kennedy slightly differently. David Rabban, a law professor at the University of Texas School of Law who is serving as general counsel of the American Association of University Professors, an appointed position, described it as a “good sign” that “in a decision that otherwise narrows the free speech of public employees generally, they recognize that there are special concerns that apply in the academic context.” He added: “They made a special point of not applying it in the university context, which to me is significant and positive.”
Other advocates for free speech and inquiry in academic settings seemed to draw little solace from the fact that the court put off for another day the question of whether to apply the narrower free speech protection to professors. “Once you have drawn this kind of distinction, which ostensibly runs across the whole gamut of a public employee’s speech, and having merely hinted that academic speakers and therefore academic freedom may somehow be different, creates only a slim reed on which to hang a public university professor’s desire to speak out,” said Robert M. O’Neil, director of the Thomas Jefferson Center and a professor of law at the University of Virginia.
The court’s decision, if applied to employees of public higher education, could have some odd ramifications, O’Neil suggested. By seeming to grant First Amendment protection to speech that is not directly related to an employee’s work but not to speech that is job-related, he said, the court has created a situation in which “the degree in protection varies inversely with the speaker’s expertise and with the potential value to society and the government of having the benefit of such speech.” Under this scenario, a chemist or philosopher who testified at a state legislative hearing by criticizing a plan to restructure the state’s community college system would be protected by the First Amendment, but a political scientist who is an expert on community college governance might not.
When reached Tuesday, O’Neil was hurriedly reworking a chapter of a book he’s writing on academic freedom – the manuscript is due Thursday. “Up to this point, it has assumed that academic speech, particularly within a professor’s field of expertise, would be First Amendment protected,” he said. “But I’m going to have to say now that you’d better not count on it.”
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This decision is an example of turf protection by the legal profession. They want no criticism of their efforts from any source, even from one of their own. The ABA should be removed from the law school accreditation process so lawyers from whom judges are selected can be properly educated. With competition, law schools and state bar examiners will have the opportunity to deliver justice to the American people rather than misguided opinions like this one.
William Sumner Scott, J. D.
William Sumner Scott, J. D., at 9:45 am EDT on May 31, 2006
It’s an odd ruling that says one relinquishes one’s citizenry on the basis of employment. Where are the limits of such a notion? Has the supreme court just reinstituted slavery in accordance with the worst warnings of the Confederate South?
Let’s look at this again: You have no freedom of speech as long as you are working. Let’s face the facts: if a work-related citizen action is not considered free speech, then anything outside of work-related speech could easily be defined as deriliction of duty. In fact, some positions consider life outside of work having a work impact, so there are no boundaries to this limitation of speech and employees are utterly at the mercy of their employers.
The worst part is that the punished communication was a matter of professional ethics — a recommendation that someone be fired for acting irresponsibly. The employers protected those that acted improperly and punished the whistle-blower and the supreme court backed them up.
There is something seriously, seriously wrong with that. When such injustice is condoned and protected by the SUPREME COURT, this country is rapidly becoming dangerous to its own citizens. This ruling is an attempt to revoke the first amendment at its very core.
Advisor Ian, Program Advisor, at 10:30 am EDT on May 31, 2006
Having read only the article and comments, I side with the critics. The ruling will cause employees to seriously ponder whether dissenting within the organization in “statements pursuant to their official duties” will subject them to termination. The chilling effect of this ruling will reduce substantially the freedom of our “free” society.
Charles Manning, at 12:40 pm EDT on May 31, 2006
First of all, I assume that everyone who commented read the decision. If you didn’t, you can’t complain about it.
Advisor Ian, Professional ethics, while important do not guarantee anyone any rights under the first amendment. In fact, a pretty good argument could be made under state law (which governs these things) that such conduct is, subject to some protection. See Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E. 2d 105 (N.Y. 1992), Matzkin v. Delaney et al, 2005, WL 2009277 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005). Substantive protections emanating from rules of professional responsibility is in its infancy, but there are some indications that it will flourish. The First amendment just isn’t the place to do it. In fact, a far, far, greater injustice would be worked if the Justices disregarded the question they had granted cert. on, and made a ruling not under the constitution, but under state law.
Mr. Scott, Instead of complaining about lawyers (and asserting that you are one), why don’t you try being a lawyer and explain why the decision was incorrect. I want to see if I can argee with you, but it is hard to when you are only offereing political rhetoric.
Larry, at 2:40 pm EDT on May 31, 2006
The notion that this odious ruling will somehow not apply to higher education is naive in the extreme. Compare what happened to college students’ freedom of the press (Hosty v. Carter) in the seventh circuit one year ago. It was believed, and argued, that the “thudges” ("jurists whose opinions have the ring, the resonance, of struck pigs of lead") of that circuit could not possibly apply the high school ruling Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier to the adult population in the circuit’s colleges. Kuhlmeier has a similar demurrer in it whereby Supreme “thudges” say, in a footnote, that the K v. H opinion MAY not apply to the possibly different circumstances in colleges. The Seventh Circuiteers said that reservation was not dispositive of anything, and the Supremes evidently concurred when they refused to grant cert to Hosty in February last.
The same process will occur following Ceballos. We cannot expect “thudges” to protect constitutional rights they do not understand, or to keep oaths they actively scorn.
John C. Bonnell, Professor at Macomb Community College, at 4:30 pm EDT on May 31, 2006
Free Speech is supposed to protect one from punishment by the government, not from employers choosing to no longer employ you or only employ you in a lesser capacity. It is about time the courts made this abundantly clear — this case is a step in the right direction.
Kevin, Undergraduate, at 4:30 pm EDT on May 31, 2006
Larry, this site gives you the right to be anonymous. But not the right from that vantage point to take cheap shots at other people’s comments.
Now to substance. This Assistant DA was sold out by the system. He did his job, was forced to compromise his presentation to the Criminal Trial Court by Carol Njera, his superior, and then hoisted on the finding by the criminal court judge that the Sheriff’s statement in support of the warrant was proper. See the description of the abuse of Ceballos on page 16 of the Souter Dissent. Carol Najera, Esquire should be under indictment for what she forced Cebellos to do at the criminal trial. Ceballo’s attorneys failed to make the main issue the improper conduct of the superiors. The lack of justice in this country begins with poor law school education and goes down hill from there. The Amicus Briefs didn’t do Ceballos any favors either. They all had different interests than a focus on why he was retaliated against. No agreement to permit the amicus briefs should have been granted by Ceballos attorneys. Poor legal work all the way around.
William Sumner Scott, J.D.
wss@jefound,org
William Sumner Scott, J.D., at 9:55 pm EDT on May 31, 2006
The simple reality of private businesses in the United States is that the majority require consent to “termination at will” as a condition of employment. To the professors who have commented: it’s ironic, but heartening, that an undergraduate (Kevin) gets this but you do not.
Dean, at 9:55 pm EDT on May 31, 2006
Larry, this site gives you the right to be anonymous. But not the right from that vantage point to take cheap shots at other people’s comments. Now to substance. This Assistant DA was sold out by the system. He did his job, was forced to compromise his presentation to the Criminal Trial Court by Carol Njera, his superior, and then hoisted on the finding by the criminal court judge that the warrant was proper. See the description of the abuse of Ceballos on page 16 of the Souter Dissent. Carol Najera, Esquire should be under indictment for what she forced Cebellos to do at the criminal trial. Ceballo’s attorneys failed to make the main issue the improper conduct of the superiors. The lack of justice in this country begins with poor law school education and goes down hill from there. The Amicus Briefs didn’t do Ceballos any favors either. They all had different interests than a focus on why he was retaliated against. No agreement to permit the amicus briefs should have been granted by Ceballos attorneys. Poor legal work all the way around.
William Sumner Scott, J.D.
William Sumner Scott, J.D., at 9:55 pm EDT on May 31, 2006
Kevin,
It is not clear what is the basis of your claim that free speech was not ‘intended’ to apply to institutions of higher learning. Indeed, universities and schools of theology were the first Western institutions to take seriously the notion that protecting speech encourage ideas to flourish. I suggest you study the evolution of the university in the Middle Ages and beyond.
I also wonder if you have any understanding of the pernicious influence of corporate conformism. I doubt you have yet worked for a major corporation and have an appreciation for how stiffling such an environment.
Roderick Beck, Roderick, at 10:05 pm EDT on May 31, 2006
” .. it has assumed that academic speech .. would be First Amendment protected .. But I’m going to have to say now that you’d better not count on it.”
With a 1,000 respects for Prof. O’Neil — I’d guess the vast majority of comments made by academics are ignored by the public, for a variety of reasons (e.g., too theoretical, too impractical, just odd). It is only crude, insensitive comments (e.g., “moral retards,” “little Eichmanns") that garner any public attention.
A.D., at 4:35 am EDT on June 1, 2006
Why is this decision even controversial? If you work for Microsoft and proclaim that Bill Gates is an idiot, you will get fired. If you work at McDonald’s and tell the customers that Burger King is better, you will get fired. Employees have never had free speech. Admittedly, there are some free speech concerns within academia, and I can accept that exploring this issue is worthwhile. But saying that a lawyer who insults his colleagues while on the job is having his free speech rights stifled is absurd.
Steve
Steve, What’s going on?, at 12:20 pm EDT on June 1, 2006
My comments have been deleted several times. None of them were abusive, even though I did point out that nobody seems to have actually have read the decision.
But, in short here are my points.
1) Mr. Scott: I said that relief should be available under state law. Not matter how terrible the fact pattern, this doesn’t mean that the constitution should be read to provide a remedy for such an injury. (But treating rules of professional responsibility as creating substantive rights is relatively new, and I provided you with some cases to this effect.)
2) Mr. Scott, you said that someone should be indicted for “forcing” someone to “do a trial.” I looked though the California penal code, and “forcing” someone to “do a trial” isn’t a crime. Therefore, to indict someone for something that isn’t a crime would violate the 5th amendment. If I missed a statute, please post it.
3) The court was careful to note that the plaintiff would still have been protected had he written a letter to the local newspaper complaining about these issues.
4) While it is all well and good to say that “employees have no rights,” in fact, public employees do have some rights, since unlike private employers, public employees cannot violate the constitution, and (absent a specific statute) a private employer could fire someone for writing a letter.
5) Finally, people keep complaining about Hosty. That was a qualified immunity issue. Hotsy wouldn’t be applicable to someone seeking reinstatement or other prospective relief, since qualified immunity (the grounds the 7th circuit ruled on) only protects state actors for money damages for constitutional violations that they reasonably couldn’t have known about.
Finally, I would urge all academics to read Supreme Court cases before talking about them. They are all online, and available for free. I know that you are all very smart, and hard-working, and I know that you would not tolerate non-academics talking about your work without reading it. The conversations will be much more interesting if people actually read the texts that they talk about.
Larry, at 11:30 am EDT on June 2, 2006
I read almost all of Larry’s posts at InsideHigherEd. From some I learn quite a bit, but from more than a few I see an attorney addressing details of legal decisions and snipping at others about issues that leave me cold and, in my opinion, are only tangential to the issue at hand. I know, I know ... I can already hear him lecturing me that the Devil is in the details.
But Larry’s recent lecture — it’s becoming a theme — that no one, least of all a scholar, has the right to comment on a legal decision unless s/he has actually read the decision is just nonsense. I suppose if we all cave in and refuse to comment on anything without having studied it at the level of “first principles,” he will still not be mollified. I can just imagine his next admonition, “No one purporting to be a scholar should comment on Supreme Court decision XT-238, Section B unless s/he has a law degree from Harvard, has clerked for a Supreme Court justice, and has read the case.”
There are many things I know — and some I know quite well — because I have relied on the knowledge and analysis of others whose backgrounds and expertise I trust. Indeed, that is why I often read Larry’s posts. Several days ago I started in on GARCETTI ET AL. v. CEBALLOS and learned, among other things, that ...
“This displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision finds no support in the Court’s precedents. The doctrinal anomaly the Court of Appeals perceived in compelling public employers to tolerate certain employee speech made publicly but not speech made pursuant to an employee’s assigned duties misconceives the theoretical underpinnings of this Court’s decisions and is unfounded as a practical matter. Pp. 8–13..”
I would have learned more, but, unfortunately I never clerked for Sandra Day O’Conner, and anyway it was time for me to tune in to Judge Mathis.
And what have I learned from Larry’s posts on this topic? Well, first, that he’s apparently read the decision and, second, that he is sometimes like a yappy Terrier nipping at the heels of the postman and barking, “Watch out for me ... watch out for me.”
Larry, what I really wanted from you was your take on what this ruling means in a very practical sense to faculty at public colleges and universities today ... and what is your sense of the meaning of this case vis-a-vis how the new “Reagan/Bush/Bush majority” will refashion both the First Amendment and academic freedom.
By the way, I think your statement, “While it is all well and good to say that ‘employees have no rights,’ in fact, public employees do have some rights, since unlike private employers, public employees (sic) cannot violate the constitution, and (absent a specific statute) a private employer could fire someone for writing a letter” is in error. Unless I’m mistaken, even private employers must obey the constitution; it’s just that when it comes to firing an employee because you don’t like the content of a letter he sent to a few friends, the constitution constrains the private employer not one iota. And, as you can tell from my earlier post, I am one of the fired.
RWH, at 12:30 am EDT on June 3, 2006
RWH, Your points are well taken. Since you are being a gentleman, here goes.
First of all, private employers cannot violate the constitution. The US Constitution only binds the government (the federal government directly, and the state government via the 14th amendment). Now, the constitution gives Congress some powers the write laws that requires that private actors do not do things that the government can’t do itself, so some analogies are often drawn, between say, Title VII and the 14th amendment, but had Congress decided not to enact Title VII, some employees would have no federal remedy against their employers. There are also a few statutes which provide specific protections of employment for exercising one’s first amendment rights (usually to religion, but sometimes to general speech). But again, Congress could repeal them tomorrow, and we would be in a state of nature. If you want, take a look at the U.S. Constitution (I am not saying you have to do this), and you will see that it is all addressed to the government.
In a few cases it has been held that a private party can’t invoke the power of the state to violate the constitution in it’s behalf. So, for example, in the famous case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (argued by a younger Thurgood Marshall) the court held that a racially restrictive covenant could not be enforced.Some state constitutions are written in a way that allows courts to interpret them as restricting private parties, but this is, in general rare.
It’s pretty amazing! There is no constitutional right not to be murdered. Just so long as the murderer doesn’t get a government paycheck (or isn’t acting on behalf of one who does – but this line is a little hazy.)
Okay, here is what I think about Cebellos. This ruling means NOTHING for people at public colleges, and people should chill out. While it might be disturbing for ethical prosecutors (and people in similar positions), I suspect that 1) more states will adopt lawyers’ rules of professional responsibility as substantive contractual rights; and 2) some state legislatures will provide specific whistle-blower protections for prosecutors.
I don’t really like to make predictions, but here is what we know. First of all, most professors can avail themselves of contractual rights in protecting their academic freedom – that is, if they have tenure, so actual issues of academic freedom (e.g. what conclusions to draw) are unlikely to come before the court any time soon. Second of all, “quasi-academic” questions, such as professors speaking outside the scope of their field (e.g. physics professors talking about national politics), probably will continue to be protected under the 1st amendment, provided they don’t mix business (teaching physics) with pleasure (talking about Bush). In this regard, if our friend Ward Churchill’s “Eichmann” remark probably remains protected. (His “misconduct” does not, unless the investigation’s *conclusions* it is actually retaliation for the “Eichmann” remark.).
Larry, at 10:05 am EDT on June 3, 2006
Greetings Dr. Beck. My point was simply that Academic freedom is based on contractual obligations, not a government-created protection from your employers.
The first amendment ONLY protects a person from government action, not from those of other individuals (including, but not limited to the people who employ you).
Kevin, Undergraduate, at 7:55 pm EDT on June 4, 2006
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Kennedy, Roberts, Alito, Scalia, Thomas ... Ouch!
While this decision has potentially disastrous consequences for the principle of academic freedom in many settings, it is merely business as usual for thousands of employees (including faculty) at private colleges and universities throughout the U.S. If worse comes to worse in this case, it will put faculty at public universities in very close to the same position faculty at private universities have been for many, many years.
I was fired last year from a small private university that has eschewed a system of tenure. Ostensibly, the reason for my firing was an innocuous, self-deprecating e-mail message I wrote and shared (from my home-office Internet service provider) with a few friends and colleagues. I had outstanding teaching evaluations, an exemplary service record, and research production that was second or third best in the business school where I taught. Because I pushed the “process” as far as I could, my case was heard by two review boards ... made up entirely of administrators. Despite my numerous requests to review the charges against me, they were not provided. I heard them for the first time at the first review board meeting ... and I was not allowed a recess of one day to prepare a response to them. The administration managed to find one faculty member – make a note of that, ONE faculty member — to testify against me, and he presented no evidence in support of his statements. Every one of his substantive statements was a falsehood, and I have documentation to prove that. My case was never heard by a committee of my peers.
Neither the American Association of University Professors nor the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of the First Amendment were the slightest bit interested in taking my case (presumably because the University was “private” ... not that it doesn’t solicit and receive state and federal funding for various programs).
In retrospect, both I and the “university” administration – but certainly not their students – are better off for my having been fired.
That, in a nutshell, is why I think this case has potentially significant consequences. Larry, where were you when I needed you?
RWH, at 9:45 am EDT on May 31, 2006