Advertisement

Advertisement

News, Views and Careers for All of Higher Education

A More Meaningful Default Rate

The Education Department’s “cohort default rate” — the rate at which student loan borrowers default within 12 to 24 months after they leave college — was initiated in the late 1980s largely to draw attention to institutions seen as preying on low-income students who may struggle to repay their loans. But changes Congress made in 1998 to how the rate is calculated have rendered it a far less useful indicator either of students’ indebtedness or of colleges’ malfeasance, numerous government and other reports have agreed in recent years.

An amendment attached to House of Representatives legislation to renew the Higher Education Act this month is designed to make the cohort default rate a more realistic assessment of how individual institutions (and lenders) are faring in keeping student borrowers on track to repayment, extending to three years from two the period over which borrowers’ defaults are measured. The change, if it becomes law, is likely to significantly raise most colleges’ default rates, which could cause problems for institutions that have historically had higher rates of student loan default — most notably for-profit career colleges, but also some two-year and historically black colleges.

“Extending it by a year should give us a more accurate assessment of what’s going on,” Rep. Timothy Bishop (D-N.Y.), who co-sponsored the amendment with Rep. Raul Grijalva (D-Ariz.), said in an interview this week. “If because of it there are more schools that now fall into an area where there’s a red flag, that are encroaching on a problem, that’s a good thing.”

The cohort default rate was largely born of concern in the mid- and late 1980s about the explosion of trade schools, particularly in cities with large populations of minority and low-income residents, that were seen as trying to build their enrollments (and profits) by enticing academically underqualified students to apply for Pell Grants or guaranteed student loans that they were unlikely to be able to repay — especially if they received a substandard education that did not lead to a good job.

The idea was that abnormally high default rates would signify a low-quality institution that was failing to prepare students for work and life, and that holding colleges accountable for the rates at which their students defaulted on loans — threatening loss of access to federal grant and loan funds for institutions whose rates exceeded 25 percent in three successive years or 40 percent in one year — would weed out fraudulent schools and force other institutions and lenders to take the issue of student debt more seriously.

In many ways, the idea worked — hundreds and hundreds of “fly by night” trade schools, as they were unfailingly referred to, shut their doors by the early 1990s after having lost their eligibility for federal aid because of their default rates. And through a series of practices adopted by colleges, lenders and governments, default rates fell throughout the 1990s.

Linking Defaults and College Quality

But as the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act approached in 1998, some college leaders bristled at the link the government had made between default rates and institutional quality. Officials at for-profit colleges and, to a lesser extent, community colleges, argued that while the default rate provisions had appropriately helped kill off poor quality colleges, it had also endangered legitimate institutions that served large numbers of low-income students who needed loans to pay their college bills.

In part to respond to those complaints, but also to offset the costs of new programs and increased funds provided in the 1998 Higher Ed Act bill, Congress altered the cohort default rate calculation by extending, to 270 days from 180 days, the amount of time before the federal government deems a delinquent borrower to be in default. That change delayed the point at which the government must take responsibility for a bad loan and repay the bank that made the loan, saving the U.S. Treasury money. But it also had the effect of making it easier to postpone a student’s potential default, raising questions about whether colleges might be encouraging borrowers to seek deferments or forbearance from lenders, since students in those situations are not in danger of defaulting.

“The default rate is a snapshot, and with a two-year rate and a 270-day window, it became easier to smile for the picture and then be beyond the window,” said Robert Shireman, executive director of the Project on Student Debt.

Several government reports have echoed concerns that Shireman and other advocates for students had long expressed about the change in the default rate calculation understating some colleges’ problems. A 2003 study by the Education Department’s Office of Inspector found that the 1998 changes to the cohort default rate definition have “materially reduced schools’ cohort default rates, while threshold percentages for schools’ ineligibility have remained unchanged since 1994,” the inspector general’s report said. “For example, because the change in the definition of default increased the number of days it takes for a borrower to default, some borrowers may not be included as defaulters in the cohort default rate calculation, even though they never make a payment on their loans and default at the first opportunity.”

The report also found that the proportion of borrowers who sought deferment or forbearance more than doubled in the late 1990s.

A 2006 study by the Education Department’s National Center for Education Statistics cited other flaws, which were analyzed in a report this fall by Education Sector, a nonpartisan research group. “The NCES study also found that, on average, defaults occurred four years following graduation — two years longer than the Department of Education follows borrowers for its default rate calculations.... [T]racking students over the life of their loans provides important information on the total number of borrowers defaulting on loans and when those defaults are most likely to occur. The Department of Education’s short, two-year time frame for tracking borrowers is especially misleading for students with the highest amount of debt. For those students, the two-year default rate looks comparable to the default rate for students with much lower debt levels. But, if you track defaults for three or more years, big differences emerge between these students.”

Congress’s Change

Those and other studies “show that the two-year window isn’t the most accurate window,” said Bishop, who spent 29 years as an administrator at the former Southampton College before entering Congress in 2002. Bishop said he, Grijalva and other House colleagues saw extending the window in which default rates were calculated by a year as a step toward better flagging “institutional problems” and giving lawmakers more accurate information about the extent of the effect of student loan burdens.

Another provision in the amendment — which was among the recommendations of the 2003 inspector general’s report — would direct the Education Department to begin collecting and reporting information by college sector (two-year, four-year, public, private, for-profit) about defaults during the entire life of a loan, which some student aid experts say is how default rates should be calculated to begin with.

“I defy anybody to explain why we need to have any kind of window other than the entirety of loan life cycle,” said Barmak Nassirian, associate executive director of the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers. “In no other setting except student loans do we decide that a default that destroys a student shouldn’t count just because it happened X many days after some window. We should move to a system where defaults count no matter when they occur.”

The higher education groups that represent nonprofit colleges enthusiastically backed the Grijalva/Bishop amendment (and in fact reportedly played a major role in initiating it). That is despite the fact that while for-profit colleges are most likely to be affected by the change, some community colleges and especially historically black institutions could see their rates climb above the thresholds that signal potential risk for financial aid funds.

A review of the institutions with the highest default rates in 2005, based on the current calculation, shows the list heavily populated by relatively small career colleges, but also has community colleges like East Georgia College and Feather River Community College and historically black institutions like Livingstone and Voorhees College with rates in the upper teens. Given estimates that the addition of a third year to the cohort default rate window could raise average rates by 60 percent, that could put such institutions over the 25 percent line that can subject a college to trouble with the Education Department.

William (Bud) Blakey, who is Washington counsel for the Thurgood Marshall College Fund, which provides support to students at historically black colleges, said the group’s members are “concerned about this, in part because we don’t know why you need to change the calculation to begin with.” Blakey said he and others would work with House members to ensure that historically black institutions were not adversely affected by the potential change.

David S. Baime, vice president for government relations at the American Association of Community Colleges, said that while we “have some colleges that are going to be at the high end of default rates” if the new rate calculation becomes law, he believed most two-year colleges would qualify for exemptions in federal law that exclude institutions at which a relatively small proportion of students take on loan debt.

Baime said his group supported the amendment as an “important anti-abuse provision that will help provide a measure of integrity to the loan programs,” adding: “Default rates have been the most proven mechanism to weed out the real rotten apples from the student aid barrel.”

Officials at for-profit colleges are clearly concerned about the proposed change in the default rate policy, although they have had relatively little to say about the idea so far. “We don’t have a position yet,” said Bob Cohen, a spokesman for the Career College Association, which represents most for-profit institutions. “We think a Congressional hearing may have clarified the need, if any, for such a change. In the short term, we are aware of no research to support such a need and are attempting to assess the possible impact of the change now.”

If representatives of for-profit colleges are likely to feel that the proposed change is unnecessary or would go too far, others assert that the tweak in the default rate calculation, while a step in the right direction, is unlikely to make much of a difference

“I think we’ve gotten beyond the point where default rates are an effective tool for assessing school quality,” said Shireman of the Project on Student Debt. “Going to three years instead of two is certainly better. But instead of fiddling around with that, we need the Department of Education, and probably accreditors, to get more sophisticated in how they assess school quality. They should be making sure students know that they’re taking out loans instead of grants. Reviewing what happens when there are significant jumps in a school’s loan volume,” which can represent a change in how a college provides financial aid to students.

“Those sorts of things would identify problems early,” Shireman said, “rather than waiting until default rates show a problem.” By then, he points out, the affected students are already out of college.

Doug Lederman

Got something to say?


Want it on paper? Print this page.
Know someone who’d be interested? Forward this story.
Want to stay informed? Sign up for free daily news e-mail.

Advertisement

Comments

” .. move to a system where defaults count ..”

” .. We should move to a system where defaults count no matter when they occur ..”

Yes. Including Tier Is with six-year graduation rates below 80%. Including Podunk Us with six-year graduation rates below 80%. And require posting of pre-graduation GRE-like scores.

Few high-performance organizations would tolerate such widespread failure. Classes with 1,000 students — even with class-par “clickers” — make nice theory, but rarely produce effective results.

Is that fear being expressed in administrative and faculty lounges, at this development? Oh, my .. how long to retirement?

L.L., at 5:15 am EST on November 30, 2007

The cohort default rate paradigm was developed before the era of widespread loan consolidation. The article discussed the impact of deferment/forbearance but not loan consolidation. Loan consolidation “interferes” with the “accuracy” of the cohort default rate: (1) provides a “fresh” one year of delinquency, thus essentially giving the borrower a potential two years of delinquency before a default is registered; (2) reduces the borrower’s monthly payment amount, thus postponing or averting many defaults (not a bad thing, but nonetheless not a feature contemplated when the law was enacted); and (3) assumes a borrower’s post-consolidation behavior (default or otherwise) can be tied to the school loan(s) originally obtained (not a given).

Jim, at 7:25 am EST on November 30, 2007

What about the share of students who borrow?

It seems that the current debate over how long to track defaults in calculating default rates continues to ignore a critical aspect of the problem — the proportion of students who borrow at different types of institutons. This is what distinguishes community colleges with high default rates but where a small share of students borrow from for-profit and other institutions with high default rates that depend on student loans as a major revenue stream. Until this aspect of the problem is dealt with, the default rate calculations and debate will continue to miss the mark.

Art Hauptman, public policy consultant, at 8:00 am EST on November 30, 2007

Default Rates

It grieves me to read both this article and some of the comments. Someone in the article called certain people “rotten apples". Is that what they are, “rotten apples"? The arrogance of some groups, individuals, or institutions to judge others before they look closely at themselves or the real problem. There are many reasons why students default, like: a less than quality academic program, a student who just wants the money with no intention or paying it back, and then there is the economy (they are losing their jobs). I do not see legislators taking the blame for so many of our jobs moving out of the country due to the tax code, or large American corporations choosing to move jobs out of the country to maximize profits. It could also be due to the cost of college being so high due to the high salaries of some faculty that never even teach.

Why don’t we establish a “meaningful” default rate of our Senators and Congressmen based on how many jobs leave the country? How about a “meaningful” default rate for Governors whose states lead in the unemployment rate? What about the default rate for all those Americans who are about to lose their homes? I wonder if they are concerned about the student loan default issue.

There are definitely suspect people in every profession, but this pointing the finger business has got to stop. You can find many ways to calculate the default rate, but instead of wasting the time of the congress to manipulate these numbers, why don’t they take that time to fix the economy? Stop pointing fingers in the wrong direction. Instead, see what you can do to improve your immediate area.

ES, at 8:30 am EST on November 30, 2007

Further fine tuning...

I agree with reforms of the current sham “cohort” default rate. Let’s go further; how about we gather data based on average default rates by instituional sector and establish triggers that would be realistic and would recognize the different missions of the sector and the populations they serve.

One size does not fit all! The exemption for schools that do not have large numbers of borrowers is only a start.

Bob, at 8:30 am EST on November 30, 2007

Avoiding the Real Problem?

So much talk about high student loan interest and default rates and so little talk about the REAL problem: the rising cost of attending college.

Pat, Student Loan Collection Manager at Major University, at 8:55 am EST on November 30, 2007

politics

It is hard to believe as close as Barmark is to politics that there is no code like his for the politicians to follow. It made no sense in 1998 to loosen the default rules and there are plenty of areas where politics rule rather than “common sense.” Nevertheless, when Congress or a political party would like to show that they have done something to solve a problem, they know all too well they only need to change the rules about how that area is measured.

Fred, at 8:55 am EST on November 30, 2007

Default Rates

If we’re really serious about tracking default rates, why don’t we calculate the default rate using all students who enter default and all who enter reyapment (and notjust a 2-3 year period)? We would all be shocked to see just how high default rates are at schools.

Don B, at 9:05 am EST on November 30, 2007

Quality and Defaults

US Senator Sam Nunn’s 1990 hearings on “Abuses in Federal Student Aid Programs” (US Senate Report 102-58) were instrumental in paving the way for the sweeping changes embodied in the 1992 Amendments to the Higher Education Act. So, I find it ironic that with the proposed changes, the student loan default rates in Nunn’s home state, Georgia, would (once again?) be featured prominently.

The Nunn Committee Report was also instrumental in exposing accreditation deficiencies and perceived inadequacy of US DOE regulatory and oversight activities (15-21), resulting in profound regulatory changes. For the most part, however, the accrediting guilds and their members successfully fended off these changes (see link below). Generally, the proprietary schools outside the guild have managed to incorporate the 1992 standards, something the public colleges and universities continue to resist.

As noted above, student loan default rates have been taken as a quality of education measure in the past, and used to pressure some schools into closing. That this tactic was used independently of the accreditation process — to target and close “diploma mills” — points to the need for accreditation reform: if accreditation hasn’t done what it was supposed to do in the first place, it needs to be changed.

Moving forward, it should be pointed out that student loan default rates are more likely to indicate overall economic trends, including employment rates and occupational changes, than the quality of education at an institution. This, of course, was what was happening in the economic downturn of the late 1980s and 1990, providing the background for the Nunn Committee hearings.

But using default rates as a surrogate for educational quality when the state of the economy is the more likely input factor points out the need to *decouple* these factors generally, in terms of higher ed policy. Just because a school’s graduates aren’t defaulting tells us more about the economy and less about that school’s quality.

Glen S. McGhee, Dir., at Florida Higher Education Accountability Project, at 9:05 am EST on November 30, 2007

Unbelievable

Can someone please tell me where the student’s responsibility is in all of this? A college can give a graduate a first-rate education but once that person moves on into a career it is job preferences, work ethic and host of other factors that will determine whether that person has, or is willing to spend the, dollars to pay their loans back. Yes, linking cohort default rates to higher education institutions is just plain wrong because it attributes control of something (propensity to default) to the wrong party (colleges and universities).

At the same time, I find it puzzling that some would like to see lenders held to this standard as well. A student signs a contract agreeing to pay the money back. Period. From that point on THEY have a fiscal responsibility to honor. People take out bank loans, car loans and mortgages all the time so I’m really not interested in the naive student borrower theory — even poor people take out auto loans, sign renters leases, buy houses and have credit cards. The fact is students and the families that support them are the borrowing culture. You can’t assign the lender responsibility for a student that defaults...they should be rewarded for giving opportunity to students who don’t have the financial means.

Headshaker, at 9:20 am EST on November 30, 2007

Reasoning

Are the loans in default because the student chooses to do so or is the economy soft(employers hiring from Asia and sending the jobs to that market)for the training the students have received thereby leaving the student in the position of overtrained for the job market to which he is applying.

Balmer, at 9:40 am EST on November 30, 2007

As a colleague once observed back in the eatly 90s, institutions don’t dafault, borrowers do. The observation is still valid today.

Rob, Executive Director, at 10:10 am EST on November 30, 2007

Kudos to Glen S. McGhee and Headshaker for seeing the real issue.

Extend default tracking for the life of the loan? Sure, it is the institutions fault if, 8 years after graduation, you hit a rough patch and default...far and away the most ridiculous reasoning I have heard to date.

Mike, at 10:25 am EST on November 30, 2007

default no fault sometimes

I agree with ES.

Jobs are being outsourced at an alarming rate. Some cities are “sanctuary” cities and affirmative action havens.

I have been told I am too old, too pretty, too smart, too whatever over and over. The other day an employment agency called me in for a job. I found out when I got there that two other candidates were up for the job. They were 20 years younger than I am, and they were minorities. The employment agency counselor was on the phone, RIGHT IN FRONT OF US. She looked over at me, whispered something into the phone to the employer, and Bam, I was told I wasn’t “right.” The other two candidates were given times for appointments and directions. THIS HAPPENS OVER AND OVER.

And what about people, like me, who go behing in their rent to pay the student loan payments, and then, finally, can’t do it anymore. Doesn’t matter if I paid for 12 months straight to the student loan and then can’t pay for awhile — it’s like throwing the money down the toilet — I AM IN DEFAULT. Even if I, or anyone else paid most of their loan off, and then got sick, BAM — default, even if $48,000 was paid and only $2,000 is left.

And how come gamblers and credit card junkies, shopaholics are allowed to write off all their debt in bankruptcy, but someone who has paid most of their student loan and then gets sick, is PUNISHED????

And why is this country showing their bleeding heart for the homeowners who had no business buying a home when they KNEW they don’t make enough money to pay the mortgage?

When you go to a good university, and you graduate with honors, one doesn’t expect to be turned down for even a crummy job. It just isn’t the same expectation.

Nanette Rayman, Writer, at 10:25 am EST on November 30, 2007

what will this prove?

I am very disappointed with Rep. Tim Bishop, himself a former financial aid administrator and usually more responsible than this. This is just going to be a return back to the days when “bad schools” were weeded out by their default rates. Don’t get me wrong, some of those were bad schools, but this is like corporations who have a policy of firing all the employees at the bottom 10% of the performance reviews every year. The bottom 10% eventually has some people who are doing their jobs well.

If enacted, this will put financial aid offices on the defensive for matters they have little if any control over. The schools who this type of policy punishes are inevitably schools who admit a large number of students who have been poorly served by the K-12 system and from lower economic backgrounds (often the same group).

Low default rates are not evidence that elite universities are good schools, they’re evidence that their students have economic advantages to begin with. High default rates reflect the opposite.

DS, at 6:20 pm EST on November 30, 2007

Automatic deduction above a threshold

This and other problems would be solved if loan repayments were deducted with borrowers’ income tax payements automatically once their income exceeded a reasonable threshold, say, average weekly earnings.

Gavin, Principal Policy Adviser at Griffith University, Australia, at 6:20 pm EST on November 30, 2007

farse

Until the federal government produces a procedure schools can follow that allows aid offices to deny students access to loan funds — without the threat of lawsuits — these changes will cause 100s or 1000s of schools out of the student loan process. Unless a student comes right out and says “I’ll never pay this back” and you tape record them saying it, you have to process the loan app and deliver the proceeds.

PMH, Director, SFS, at 7:00 pm EST on November 30, 2007

Defaulted loans are money makers, people.

I keep making the point that defaulted loans are big money makers for the industry, and even the federal government, yet no one seems to be listening.

Sallie Mae’s “fee income” increased by 107% between 2001-2004. In 2003, Albert Lord told shareholders that their record profits that year were due to two things: Loan originations, and collections on defaulted loans.

Moreover, Sallie Mae paid some $3.4 million in penalties for violations of the False Claims Act to the U.S. Government when it was found that its employees weren’t even attepting to contact borrowers who were delinquent.

Further, it was reported in January, 2004 in a piece by John Hechinger of the Wall Street Journal that for every dollar paid out in default claims to lenders, the federal government was getting back $1.20...Actually MAKING, not losing money from defaulted loans.

This is a predatory lending system, and the lenders and government really have no interest in preventing defaults.

Finally, the NCES found that a whopping 20% of students borrowing more than $15,000 default on their loans within 10 years. The lifetime rate (like what Barmak Nassirian is arguing for), is probably about 1 in four.

This system is predatory, predatory, predatory. Again, I shout: THIS SYSTEM IS PREDATORY!!!

Not that many of you care, but incidentally- people lives are being ruined because of it.Not inconvenienced- RUINED.

And why? Because they sought to better themselves through higher education, only to run into trouble, and face loan balances of double, triple, or far more than they originally borrowed.

Alan Collinge, Founder at StudentLoanJustice.Org, at 6:40 am EST on December 1, 2007

One last thing.

One last thought. Im getting pretty tired of the smugness I see here, in particular those of you who are quick to talk about students taking out loans with no intentionas of ever paying the money back.

Of all the defaulted borrowers I have met- and I know thousands- I daresay that not a single one of them signed their loan papers with any ill-intent. Students in general are very trusting, and willing to sign whatever they need to in order to get registered for class. Most honestly believe that their education will allow them to easily repay any amount borrowed for their educations.

Even if such clever, ne’er do well students existed, how does one explain the rest? Given that 25% of borrowers (who borrow more than, say, $20,000) will default, this leaves a massive number who can’t be thrown aside by ascribing ill will to them.

What about the fact that nearly every consumer protection has been removed for student loans, and that it is more profitable for the industry, particularly the guarantors and collection companies- when a loan defaults?

The lending industry, and university staff who are so so quick to wring their hands, and use personal responsibility as a cover for irresponsible lending, and shameless tuition increases need to change their tunhe.

The old one has been heard too many times.

Alan Collinge, Founder at Studentloanjustice.org, at 6:40 am EST on December 1, 2007

Flaws in the Cohort Default Rate

The Cohort Default Rate is an inherently short-term measure of defaults. Increasing the time frame from 2 years to 3 years does not significantly alter this. Rather than try to make the cohort default rate more long-term, I would suggest maintaining two separate default rate measures, one short-term and one long-term, each with separate thresholds.

The short-term measure would provide responsiveness to more immediate problems, such as a sudden increase in defaults soon after graduation. The long-term measure would provide a more realistic measure of the likelihood of default.

As others have noted, deferments and forbearances delay the impact of an eventual default, and consolidation loans reset the clock and dilute the statistics. On the other hand, past use of the early repayment status loophole to obtain an in-school consolidation may have the opposite effect, as such loans lost the six month grace period (likely causing earlier defaults and an increase in the cohort default rate as these borrowers graduate).

Another problem is that the cohort default rate is per-borrower and not per-dollar-lent. As such, it does not adequate address the financial risk to the federal government from the loans.

For a longer-term measure of defaults, there are two main possibilities. One is to use a much larger backward looking window. The other is to just keep a running overall percentage of borrowers/dollars who have ever defaulted.

Mark

Mark Kantrowitz, Publisher at FinAid.org, at 4:20 pm EST on December 4, 2007

Advertisement

 Jobs Related to A More Meaningful Default Rate

or search for jobs directly.

Financial Aid Counselor
SUNY College of Technology at Alfred

Nestled in a beautiful valley in the western Southern Tier of New York State, Alfred State College has a long tradition of ... see job

Director of Financial Aid and Student Financial Planning
Roger Williams University

Roger Williams University is one of the top ranked liberal arts universities in the Northeast and is an Equal Opportunity ... see job

Associate Director of Financial Aid
Roger Williams University

Roger Williams University is one of the top ranked liberal arts universities in the Northeast and is an Equal Opportunity ... see job

Financial Aid Technician I
Maricopa Community College District

Provides a variety of responsible clerical assistance in application processing, awarding and record keeping activities ... see job

Assistant Director
Ithaca College

Job Description: Ithaca College’s Office of Student Financial Services is looking for an Assistant Director ... see job

Associate Director of Student Financial Services
Harvard University

Associate Director of Student Financial Services see job

National Director of Financial Aid
Concorde Career Colleges, Inc.

Our work environment is dynamic. Our people are valued. A rewarding career awaits you at Concorde! Concorde Career Colleges, ... see job

Associate Director of Financial Aid for Programs
East Carolina University

East Carolina University, a constituent institution of the University of North Carolina, is a doctoral institution with an ... see job

Student Finance Planner
Corinthian Colleges

Everest Institute, a respected member of the Corinthian Colleges’ network of schools, is dedicated to helping students ... see job

Coordinator of Student Employment
University of Colorado

Posting Description: This position is a full-time professional exempt position reporting to the Associate ... see job