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Give Me Liquidity!

April 24, 2009

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Maybe being Harvard isn’t so great after all.

Mesmerized by the investment returns posted by the wealthiest universities in recent years, colleges with endowments large and small have been drawn toward risky strategies that were credited with significant gains at some institutions. While the economic downturn doesn’t appear to have prompted a wholesale realignment, there are early indications that some investment chiefs are rethinking their approaches.

“A lot of them probably shouldn’t have been doing this [style of investing] in the first place, because they don’t have the oversight, they don’t have the staff,” said John Nelson, managing director of Moody's Public Finance Group. “They were trying to follow the big endowment strategy without increasing their staff costs and consulting costs.”

If there’s any trend emerging, it’s that institutions with endowments of varied sizes are moving toward more liquid investments that allow for speedier access to cash. Met with significant demands on resources at a time when resources are dwindling, colleges simply need money now – like right now. The urgent need for cash on hand, or liquidity, has some finance chiefs looking to disentangle themselves from the complex, long-term investment vehicles that came into vogue across higher education in the last decade.

“It is definitely back to the future in terms of investing,” Nelson said. “You’ll probably see small and medium endowments looking more like they did 10 years ago.”

While college officials are often rather cautious about discussing specific investment strategies, several have tipped their hands slightly in recent months. The University of Chicago, Harvard University and Northeastern University have all indicated they’re going to become less reliant on potentially “illiquid” assets like private equity, a category that includes investments in start-up companies. These investments are complex because they involve assets that aren’t publicly traded, and colleges that aim to get into the private equity game need great knowledge and expertise to accurately value the assets. Moreover, the payoff in private equity typically takes years – a luxury many colleges can’t afford right now.

Seeking quick access to funds, Northeastern University officials recently took a dramatic step. The university has liquidized up to 50 percent of its endowment, Faculty Senate minutes indicate.

Northeastern officials declined to discuss how exactly the university is changing its asset mix, but a Moody’s report indicates the university now has 44 percent of its endowment in cash – the most liquid asset of all. By placing nearly half of its endowment in cash, Northeastern is likely moving out of some of its longer-term investments and placing funds into easily accessible arenas like money market accounts, CDs and short-term treasury bonds.

Northeastern’s move toward a lower risk investment strategy comes on the heels of significant endowment declines. The value of the university’s endowment has dropped by 25 percent to $500 million since June, according to Senate minutes. Losses on that scale, however, have not been uncommon since Wall Street took its slide. Indeed, college endowment returns dropped by an average of 22.5 percent in the first six months of the 2009 fiscal year, according to a report issued by the Commonfund Institute and the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO).

26 Percent Decline? Congrats

Given the losses experienced by so many colleges, some financial chiefs say they’re satisfied with any strategy that staved off declines below 30 percent.

“Our returns are not positive, but they could be worse,” said Annette Parker, chief financial officer at Dickinson College, in Pennsylvania.

Dickinson, which has boasted significant returns in recent years, saw its endowment value fall by 26 percent to $259 million in the first half of this fiscal year. While it has a relatively small endowment, Dickinson has invested in areas that have traditionally been the province of the wealthiest institutions. Nearly 60 percent of the university’s investments are in private equity or alternative investments like hedge funds. While some of these financial instruments are complex, Parker says the university has done its homework – or at least hired those who have.

“I think that’s a misnomer and I really get disturbed when people say you’re being risky with your portfolio,” Parker said.

Dickinson is part of a nine-college consortium with assets managed by Investure, a firm founded by a longtime endowment manager at the University of Virginia. Absent the firm’s management and oversight, Parker says she too would be worried about Dickinson’s asset mix.

“It is true that when little guys try to invest in non-traditionals they are challenged because they lack the staff to do that,” Parker said.

“[But] while we look like we have a small endowment, we’re part of a five billion dollar pool,” she added.

Dickinson’s investments in potentially tricky areas are significantly greater than those of institutions with similarly sized endowments. About 31 percent of the college’s endowment is invested in alternative investment strategies such as hedge funds, compared with an average of 16 percent for colleges with comparable endowments, according to NACUBO. Ditto for private equity, where Dickinson has nearly 27 percent of its investments, compared to about 4 percent for other colleges with endowments of similar size.

While Parker says she’s confident Dickinson would be in a worse position financially if the college had a more traditional investment strategy, there are changes in the works. Dickinson isn’t pulling out of private equity, but the college isn’t getting any deeper into it, either.

“We’re sensitive to the market, and therefore we are not going to be increasing our private equity exposure,” she said.

“Exposure” is the operative word as colleges assess new investment strategies, and some are considering whether they simply have too much of it. At Chicago, where a $6.63 billion endowment has fallen some 30 percent since June, President Robert J. Zimmer recently said the university is asking itself some fundamental investing questions.

“There’s a lot of thought being given at the investment committee and the board of trustees right now to what does this tell us and how do we think about our risk and return,” Zimmer told Bloomberg. “And not just how do we mitigate risk, but how much risk should we be absorbing?”

As for the answers to such questions, a university spokesman said “I don’t think anyone is going to comment on that.” There’s little question, however, that Chicago is looking to strike the right balance between investing for the long-run and maintaining quality in the short term.

“Universities were fully invested when the crash came because our investment strategies had been successful, and when the crash came a lot of us suddenly found ourselves with near-term cash flow problems,” said Bob Rosenberg, a Chicago spokesman. “That reality is going to have an impact on wherever we go in terms of investment strategy.”

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Comments on Give Me Liquidity!

  • Time for some trustee resignations?
  • Posted by Wick Sloane on April 24, 2009 at 10:15am EDT
  • As this fine article points out, there is an elephant in the room that no one is discussing during these reviews of endowment performance. Who's accountable for these high-risk, and usually high-testosterone, investment strategies? The trustees are.

    Presidents are left to write letters about budget cuts. Presidents I have encountered may be at the investment policy meetings, but trustees, not presidents, set the allocation strategies. Why shouldn't the trustees of all institutions that lost, say, 20% or more resign?

    This is a question for we, the people, every one of us. These endowments grew and grew due to immense alumni generosity and, to a degree, investment management that was successful at the time. These endowments grew, too, due to federal tax policy allowing for generous federal tax deductions for donations to colleges and universities. This tax policy also allowed these endowments to grow tax free. Fair enough. What this means, making rough estimates for tax rates, is that 30% of these endowments are public resources, allocated by we, the people, to these non-profit institutions to contribute to the greater good. Again, fair enough. Colleges and universities apply some of these funds to educating the poor. Hospitals heal the poor who are sick.

    What happened to these resources entrusted to these institutions? As this article notes, billions went into high-risk investments. The issue isn't whether such investments are good or bad in the abstract. These liquidity crises illustrate with magnificent clarity that these institutions invested more in these securities than they could afford. Endowment 101 says that people and institutions lucky enough to have the funds should have money enough for known expense over the next two to five years in cash or bonds, just to avoid these liquidity crises. I am pulling this from Charles Ellis, the guru of Greenwich Associates, a thoughtful, main-line advisor. This is not a left-wing idea.

    What this all means is that 30% of these losses, too, were public assets we, the people, entrusted to these trustees. Many institutions that had enough money to be need-blind or two eliminate loans to poor students, such as mine at a community college, can no longer to so. The reason is not due to the economy and force majeure. The reason is that these trustees took risks they had no business taking with funds that were not theirs to risk.

    Endowment 101 also relates risk to reward. The higher the potential return, the higher the risk. The issue is not to take risks beyond what you can afford to lose. The high-testosterone endowments -- Williams and Yale and Harvard, for example -- competed for returns of 20% and 25% and more. This was at a time when the risk-free rate, US Treasuries, hovered nearer to 5%.

    I read and I heard, often from these trustees, during those growth years all the reasons why going for risks four and five times the risk-free rate was not only, in investment-speak, "prudent" but even common sense. Well, those trustees were wrong. The people who will pay are the students, again burdened with loans to pay for tuitions going up again due to the errors of the trustees.

    Shouldn't we, the people, be asking for some resignations of those who lost all this money?

  • response to wick
  • Posted on April 24, 2009 at 3:00pm EDT
  • Wick, I take issue with a couple of your points.

    1. Not taxing income used as gifts to non-profits and not taxing the capital gains of non-profits' investments does NOT make those dollars "public resources." That kind of assertion is based on a socialist perspective that all resources are public - the government just magnanimously lets you keep a portion to work with. An alternate perspective is that all resources are private, and we accept an amount of infringement on those private resources in the form of taxes to provide certain public services. On similar grounds, I call horseshit on the statement that 30% of the losses were public assets.

    2. Trustees are by definition entrusted to manage institutions and assets that no one holds an ownership in. So, yes, the funds *were* the trustees' to risk. Since you called out Endowment 101, I'll call out Investment 101. The longer the investment horizon, the more volatility (risk) you can accept in exchange for higher potential returns. Given that publicly traded stocks in general have dropped, what, 25% or 30%, then I'd say that an endowment dropping 25% or 30% is pretty much par for the course. That's not an indictment on trustees. That's expected results.

    3. "these institutions invested more in these securities than they could afford. Endowment 101 says that people and institutions lucky enough to have the funds should have money enough for known expense over the next two to five years in cash or bonds, just to avoid these liquidity crises." This is where I agree with you. What makes the recent endowment losses problematic is that trustees systematically overestimated their investment horizon. They invested as though they wouldn't need the funds for 50 years when in reality there is a portion they need next week, next month, and next year.

    Your call for the resignation of trustees is pure hyperbole, but that's fine...you're trying to make a point. I agree that many boards of trustees made a mistake, but we disagree fundamentally on the nature of that mistake. You seem to think that tax policy entitled the public to a large share of institutional assets and therefore the trustees should have acted in a much less risk tolerant manner. I think that trustees overestimated their investment horizon and therefore should have acted in a much less risk tolerant manner.

    Interesting how two very different sets of assumptions do come to similar final conclusions.

  • Or Give Me Death?
  • Posted by DFS on April 29, 2009 at 6:30pm EDT
  • Isn't that what the headline begged?
    Response, you are entirely correct.
    Wick, I hereby withdraw my nomination for you as the Secretary of Education.
    Not everything in our lives is a Zero-Sum Game, as you imply.