Search Views


Browse Archives

Views

Engaging the Military

September 21, 2009

Share This Story

FREE Daily News Alerts

Advertisement

Over the past two years, there has been considerable controversy over attempts by the Pentagon to recruit anthropologists and other social scientists to assist in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the “global war on terror.” Like the American Psychiatric Association and American Medical Association, which banned members’ participation in torture and interrogation, anthropologists have widely criticized the use of anthropology in counterinsurgency as unethical.

Of particular concern has been the U.S. Army’s “Human Terrain Team” program under which (sometimes armed) social scientists are embedded in brigades deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan to provide cultural knowledge that assists with combat operations. Many anthropologists agree that the Human Terrain program and other counterinsurgency activities violate the American Anthropological Association’s code of ethics, which commits members to do no harm to the people with whom they work, prohibits covert research, and requires researchers to obtain informed consent and to avoid doing things that could endanger the work of future anthropologists. Many have likewise criticized the recruitment of anthropologists as an effort to forestall bringing troops home from Iraq and Afghanistan, continuing the policies that have left the United States mired in deadly, unpopular wars.

Spurred by such concerns, in October 2007, the executive board of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) called the Human Terrain program “an unacceptable application of anthropological expertise.” Between 2007 and 2008, more than 1,000 anthropologists agreed to boycott the program, signing a pledge of non-participation in counterinsurgency as part of a campaign organized by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists (I am a member of the steering committee).

Supporters of the Human Terrain program have often claimed that those opposed to working in the wars are advocating total academic disengagement from the military and a retreat to the ivory tower. This could not be further from the truth. Most opponents of the Human Terrain program, myself included, are not categorically opposed to work and engagement with the military. To the contrary, many believe that anthropologists can ethically teach soldiers in classrooms, train peacekeepers, or consult with military and other government officials about cultural, social, historical, and political-economic issues.

Indeed, the campaign against anthropological collaboration in counterinsurgency has coincided with and helped fuel a recent efflorescence of research and work on an expanding array of issues related to the military and foreign policy. Far from calling for a retreat to the ivory tower, a growing number of anthropologists are actively involved in research both with and about the U.S. and other militaries, foreign policymaking and policymakers, war, conflict, and militarization.

Inspired by anthropologists like Laura Nader, Kathleen Gough, Mina Davis Caulfield, Marshall Sahlins and Eric Wolf, anthropologists have studied topics as diverse as nuclear weapons policy, the training of foreign military personnel at the School of the Americas, the shadowy world of the global arms trade, and the harmful effects of military bases. My own research has investigated the creation of the secretive U.S. base on Britain’s Indian Ocean island Diego Garcia, the expulsion of the island’s indigenous people during development of the base, and the significance of the base for U.S. foreign policy.

As a result of this work, I recently attended a two-day meeting of anthropologists, historians, sociologists, and political scientists organized by the newly founded Eisenhower Research Project for the Critical Study of Armed Forces and Militarization. Hosted by co-directors Catherine Lutz and Aaron Belkin and project manager Christina Rowley at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies, participants discussed subjects as diverse as U.S. military spending (which now equals or exceeds that of all the other nations of the world combined), military checkpoints in Iraq, the increasing use of remote-controlled robots and other advanced technologies in war, the military’s role in the war on drugs, the militarization of the U.S. border, the armed services’ dependence on so-called military wives and military families, and the role of Hollywood and popular culture in glorifying war.

Most importantly, the interdisciplinary group of scholars dedicated itself not just to conducting research on military issues, but also to attempting to influence national conversations and public opinion about military and foreign policy. For too long in the past anthropologists and other social scientists have indeed isolated themselves in the ivory tower, ceding policy debates to international relations and security scholars, to think tanks generally invested (intellectually or literally) in war, to arms manufacturers’ lobbyists, to pundits, politicians, and the Pentagon.

Our nation is at a critical moment in determining the role the military is going to play in the world and the shape of our relations with other nations. President Obama has indicated his desire to chart a different course in the nation’s foreign policy from that of President Bush, to make diplomacy, cooperation, and engagement the hallmarks of U.S. international relations.

And yet, while slowly trying to extricate the nation from a deadly, illegal war in Iraq, we appear ready to repeat the same mistakes of that war, and Vietnam before it, in pursuing an increasingly violent war of occupation in Afghanistan — a nation where the British and Soviet empires failed before us in their attempts to impose foreign rule. Rather than learning from these past mistakes, from the lesson that there can be no military solution to the challenge posed by the Taliban and others resisting occupation, the escalation of U.S. troops and bombing in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is an increasingly bloody diversion from the political, economic, and diplomatic initiatives that must be at the heart of any solution to violent conflict.

Given the growing crisis in Afghanistan, which threatens to derail Obama’s agenda abroad and at home, the skills and original perspectives of anthropologists and other social scientists are desperately needed to build a new direction for U.S. military and foreign policy. This will mean conducting research of direct relevance to the U.S. military, to the State Department, and to the dynamics of U.S. global relations. This will mean shedding anthropologists’ traditional hesitancy about proposing proscriptive solutions to identified problems (the bread and butter of many international relations scholars). This will mean writing not primarily for academic audiences but instead for policymakers, politicians, and the wider public.

It will mean doing so not in the pages of (generally obscure) academic journals, but in the op-ed pages of newspapers, for blogs and major web outlets, and for the likes of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy. And it will mean building on efforts like the Eisenhower Research Project to create a new breed of policy think tanks — think tanks staffed by a diverse group of social scientists, driven by empirical research, and frequently working in collaboration with military leaders and others in the national security bureaucracy to create new policy approaches.

The Pentagon’s efforts to recruit anthropologists for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the failure of U.S. foreign policy rather than innovation. They are a return to the sad beginnings of anthropology — the “handmaiden of empires” — when the discipline was born as a tool to assist in the rule and control of colonized peoples in Africa, Asia, and North America. The recruitment of anthropologists represents the misguided belief that victory in Iraq and Afghanistan can be achieved through better tactics — if only we could fight smarter, know more about their cultures, and embed anthropologists with the troops, then we would “win”! — rather than realizing that the real lesson these wars is that wars of invasion and occupation should not be waged at all.

The nation must use this moment to embrace a permanent and fundamental change in our military and foreign policy. We must finally reject a foreign policy of invasion and occupation and embrace a new kind of foreign policy based around non-aggression, diplomacy, international cooperation, and the protection of human needs and human lives as the best way to ensure the security of the country and the world. With members of the military and an engaged citizenry as our partners and allies, anthropologists and other social scientists have a critical role to play in this process.

David Vine is assistant professor of anthropology at American University. He is the author of the recently released Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia(Princeton University Press) and co-author of The Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual, or Notes on Demilitarizing American Society (Prickly Paradigm Press, 2009).

See all postings »
Advertisement
Advertisement

Matching Jobs

Comments on Engaging the Military

  • HTS and the Military
  • Posted by Ben Wintersteen , Social Science at Human Terrain System on September 21, 2009 at 8:00am EDT
  • Hello David,

    I have many of the same concerns you do, so I decided to become involved to understand first-hand the complex systems of issues surrounding anthropologists' participation in the military. I do not beleive that it is responsible for us to approach the problem from the outside, relying entirely on the etic view of the institution, policy, and culture of the military. Instead, we must engage it fairly and with the same relativist view we would approach any social context.

    I understand the historical precedent, past failures, and slippery slope argument that lead many anthropologists to be nervous about our active role in foreign policy at the ground level. I do not agree that we should focus on the negative aspects of military culture, or resort to anti-colonialist arguments in the shifting context of the current wars.

    I have been publicly maintaining a blog site, detailing my personal, professional, and program experiences since I began the program in June of this year. My concerns have been the ethics, efficacy, and experiences of HTS members both in training and abroad.

    While I readily admit I am not even through training yet, I felt it was important to keep a public running commentary on my own participant-observation of the program, military surrounding it, and the effects at home and abroad. I welcome your thoughts.

    Ben Wintersteen
    www.thoughts.com/boltbait

  • study of the military; military study
  • Posted by theron on September 21, 2009 at 12:00pm EDT
  • As a quasi military historian (my dissertation focused upon a WWII Army company and my current work focuses on the WWII era merchant marine), I welcome the perspective in this article. The act of warring per force tries to link the abstractions of policy with actions...and the human and social consequences of those actions. At the same time, it reveals the absolute disconnect between meaning and act. To use anthropologists as tools of war instead of teachers misses this point, allowing the policy makers and the war-rmakers who implement that policy to avoid the contradictions. The contradictions, in turn, doom the policy, just as in Vietnam, Iraq and the British and Soviet attempts in Afganistan.

    After WWII, sociologists and historians reexamined data collected during the war and drew lessons from it. Stouffer's THE AMERICAN SOLIDER series, the studies of ineffective units and a host of shorter pieces in various journals examined military culture, examined the impact of events and changing demographics upon that culture...and the impact of events on both assumptions and policies revealed throughout the war. We should do no less..and perhaps more...as we face a globalized world in which intermingling cultures and the resulting stresses are the rule rather than the exception.

  • Vine again hits the nail on the head
  • Posted by Gretchen E. Schafft , Public Anthropologist in Residence at American University on September 22, 2009 at 12:30pm EDT
  • Once again, my colleague David Vine goes to the heart of the issue. There is a contradiction between the anthropologist's code of ehtics and participation on the field during wartime. This professional disconnect is also broader, however, than just the ethical guideline of a single social science. It goes to the failure of our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The citizens of those countries know that our good will gestures are based on winning a military victory. They are inextricably linked. Therefore, the good will, nation-building, or good deeds embrace a threat, never far behind.
    Furthermore, the anthropologists observations and suggestions are to be sent back to a central location in the States to be reduced to codable material for dissemination. This is not the way anthropologists work. Our observations and recommendations are time and place specific. A meta-analysis is only undertaken when conditions are similar enough to make such a comparison useful. This will compare unlike entities and pretend there are universal truths coming from data points. Nothing could be as repulsive to an anthropologist.
    The basic premises used to encourage social science engagement in warzones is faulty, in fact impossible. Thanks to Vine, we are reminded of that once again.
    Gretchen Schafft, Ph.D., M.H.S.

  • Simple Questions
  • Posted by Ben Wintersteen , Social Scientist at Human Terrain System on September 23, 2009 at 12:30pm EDT
  • Is there nothing to be learned by anthropologists about how human beings work within warzones or conflict areas?

    Followed by:

    Considering that most (if not all) anthropologists can ONLY do their work with institutional support, are there particular agendas with which anthropologists should not associate (and thereby limit cultural knowledge of those situations)?

    I ask this question having worked for an NGO dedicated to cultural revival and preservation, worked beside people funded by the Government through NSF, World Bank, and WHO, and I am now working from within (and on) the military.

  • Rights
  • Posted by DFS on September 24, 2009 at 1:00pm EDT
  • Okay, I'll admit that I'm a mathematician and not degreed in the 'social whatever.'

    Nevertheless, as a veteran, and further, as a former intelligence analyst, I have some kind of perspective on this situation.

    This will always be dynamic, now, and increasingly so, for obvious reasons, but then there has to be some ethical standard.

    Let the individual, presumably educated (or even not) choose. If he holds some association in a professional body, his decision to advance the effort undertaken by the nation must not be held against him.

    Else, the association violates that first amendment to the constitution recognizing freedom of association. Further, then, that association ethically must divorce itself in name from the nationally decided policy with which it disagrees.

    There is the real crux of the issue. If the association is the "American Association of (whatever)," then, when it divorces itself from the nation it becomes the "Association of (whatever)." This is untenable.

    To quote from Moses, "Let my people go." Don't hold against them what they inidividually and in good faith and conscience decide to do for themselves and for their nation.

    We are supposed to be educated, with 'academic freedom.' Why can't we have 'personal freedom,' and still have freedom of association?

  • Further,
  • Posted by DFS on September 24, 2009 at 3:15pm EDT
  • I went back over the 'meta-comments' here.

    (1) "so I decided to become involved to understand first-hand the complex systems of issues surrounding anthropologists' participation in the military" -- Does this mean that he was in the military, or overseas there at the time?

    (2) "As a quasi military historian (my dissertation focused upon a WWII Army company and my current work focuses on the WWII era merchant marine), I welcome the perspective in this article" -- And you were there, during WWII? Were you in the military, or overseas there at the time?

    (3) "The basic premises used to encourage social science engagement in warzones is faulty, in fact impossible. Thanks to Vine, we are reminded of that once again." -- Okay, there was no admitted service, nor context, other than perhaps reading all about it.

    (4) "I ask this question having worked for an NGO dedicated to cultural revival and preservation, worked beside people funded by the Government through NSF, World Bank, and WHO, and I am now working from within (and on) the military." -- from within how, in Washington, DC?

    There's nothing like context, in academia. Or, at least that's what I've been told, all of my life.

    There must be such a thing as meta-reality, based upon meta-'whatever someone wrote down and had it approved by someone who had the 'meta' interest involved.'

  • Clarifying Context
  • Posted by Ben Wintersteen , Social Scientist at Human Terrain System on September 24, 2009 at 9:45pm EDT
  • Hi DFS, I just wanted to sift out the two parts that were posted by me, so I could answer them directly.

    You said:

    (1) "so I decided to become involved to understand first-hand the complex systems of issues surrounding anthropologists' participation in the military" -- Does this mean that he was in the military, or overseas there at the time?

    (4) "I ask this question having worked for an NGO dedicated to cultural revival and preservation, worked beside people funded by the Government through NSF, World Bank, and WHO, and I am now working from within (and on) the military." -- from within how, in Washington, DC?

    I am working with the Human Terrain System, an anthropologist hired by TRADOC and the HTS through a third-party contractor (While in training) to be deployed into theater as a DoD Civilian Federal employee as part of a Human Terrain Team.

    Does that clarify a bit?

    Ben

    Blog: Thoughts.com/boltbait/blog

  • Thanks, Ben
  • Posted by DFS on September 26, 2009 at 2:15pm EDT
  • Yes, that does. I look forward to your future comments about it.

    I am also pleased that the efforts of the 'concerned' are not necessarily riding rough-shod over the efforts of all in your discipline.

    I don't tolerate totalitarians, and in my view these 'concerned' are definitely that.

    All the best.