Burlington College announced Monday that it is shutting down its operations, The Burlington Free Press reported. Operations will end May 27. The college has been told that its primary lender will not extend a line of credit and that the college’s accreditor, which placed the college on probation, was not expected to lift the probation. Burlington is a small college focused on the liberal arts and progressive styles of education. Coralee Holm, dean of operations, told the newspaper that the college could not recover from the “crushing weight of the debt” incurred after the college in 2010 purchased 32 acres of lakefront property from the Archdiocese of Burlington.
Some supporters of the college blamed the inability to pay for that purchase on Jane Sanders, president at the time. She resigned in 2011 and has been in the news more recently as the wife of Senator Bernie Sanders, who is running for the Democratic presidential nomination. Sanders declined to comment to Inside Higher Ed for a 2014 article on the college’s sinking finances, but told Vermont publications that she left the college with a plan to pay off the debt through increased enrollment. Those increases did not materialize.
Andover Newton Theological School, the oldest theological school and graduate institution in the United States, announced last week that it will form a partnership with the Yale University Divinity School. Andover Newton, located outside of Boston, has faced financial challenges, and many theological schools have struggled to make their programs affordable. Andover Newton will continue to provide some instruction in Massachusetts but will start the process of relocating to Yale's New Haven, Conn., home while finishing negotiations on plans to become part of the divinity school there, as a unit to be called Andover Newton at Yale. Officials said the combination would help both institutions offer more aid to students with financial need.
Moody's, the credit ratings agency, this week said it changed its financial outlook to negative for three of the seven public universities in Kansas. This year the state's budget will strip $17.7 million from public higher education, which represents about 3 percent of the universities' total state support. State government is proposing a further cut of 3 percent next year.
Universities in Kansas are relatively reliant on state funding, Moody's said, which accounts for between 20 and 35 percent of their revenue. Moody's gave the negative outlook to Kansas State University, Wichita State University and Pittsburg State University. The flagship University of Kansas already had that designation.
"The proposed funding reductions by themselves are manageable with continued careful expense containment," Moody's said in its report. "However, declining numbers of in-state high school students and aggressive regional competition are also applying pressure on tuition revenue, the largest source of revenue for all Kansas public universities."
Nevada System of Higher Education Chancellor Dan Klaich resigned Thursday following allegations that the state agency he headed misled lawmakers who were seeking to change state college and university funding formulas.
Klaich submitted his resignation at a special meeting of the Nevada System of Higher Education Board of Regents, the Las Vegas Review-Journal reported. The meeting was called after the Review-Journal wrote about emails obtained under a public records law, saying they indicated the Nevada System of Higher Education -- which oversees the state's public colleges and universities -- misled lawmakers studying state higher education support in 2011 and 2012. Klaich said he was resigning to avoid becoming a distraction but that the emails were taken out of context. The Board of Regents approved an agreement including no admission of wrongdoing that will allow Klaich to keep his pay through June 2017, which includes a base salary of $303,000 plus automobile and housing allowances.
The University of Southern California has announced a $200 million gift from Larry Ellison, the founder of Oracle. The gift will support a new interdisciplinary center on cancer research and treatment.
No concept is arguably more popular in higher education policy today or seems to have broader consensus than institutional “skin in the game”: the idea that colleges need to be on some sort of financial hook when their students don’t succeed.
Students and families are spending near-record amounts on postsecondary training, yet students are dropping out and defaulting on loans at disturbingly high rates. Mix in high-profile collapses like Corinthian Colleges and near-daily stories of college graduates struggling to find employment, and we get policy makers coming to the disheartening conclusion that our higher education institutions are incapable of doing the very thing we expect of them -- creating capable graduates -- unless threatened with financial sanctions.
Yet is this really the case? Colleges spend a lot to recruit and retain students, and every one that leaves without completing represents lost time, money and effort that require more recruitment and retention dollars to replace him or her. Students who don’t finish or who complete but struggle to find employment create nothing but negative reputational outcomes that institutions must invest both time and resources to counteract. Plus, when those same students leave with loan debt and struggle to repay it, the institution may yet again spend dollars and effort on default prevention services.
Put it all together and it’s pretty clear that when students fall off a successful education path, institutions pay a very real financial price. But this is exactly what having skin in the game entails. So why are we pushing for policy and regulation to accomplish what’s already taking place?
Making colleges pay a second time for poor outcomes doesn’t make much sense, although critics will say that market-driven financial penalties are obviously just not doing enough to change institutional behavior. To believe that, however, we have to believe institutions, as producers, actually prefer to see some of their education outputs fail.
That’s awfully strange. If institutions could control how much students learn, then why would they consciously choose to send unprepared graduates into the labor market where they struggle to find and keep employment? And if they could control who graduates and who doesn’t, what economic rationale do they have for producing a mix of graduates and dropouts? If they really had a choice, why would they ever produce anything other than graduates?
Colleges today face a continuous barrage of criticism about whether they provide value for money, and so we’re left to ask under what circumstances colleges that capably control learning, degree completion and postgraduate employment outcomes would actually opt to produce substandard products. Does a business approach that thrives on threats of greater regulatory scrutiny exist? Does a “student failure” model bringing about additional enrollment management, default prevention and reputational costs make operational sense?
It’s pretty obvious that if institutions could control the types of outcomes that skin-in-the-game proposals wanted to see improvements on they’d already be doing so. What colleges and universities wouldn’t benefit from high graduation rates, stellar job placement statistics and graduates who earned enough money to comfortably pay off their student loans?
It’s also why the argument that the financial costs institutions already face just aren’t harsh enough doesn’t make much sense. It’s like suggesting that my dog doesn’t speak English because I’m just not spending enough time teaching him. The outcome and process we’re trying to link don’t fit the way we think they do.
What’s missing from the equation is the idea that academic success is a two-way street where students’ academic preparation, motivation and effort do as much to shape the outcomes we care about as the resources institutions provide them. In its absence, the obvious consequences of policies that only hold colleges accountable for outcomes that they share control over is that they put their effort into the things they can control -- which, in this case, is picking students they think are most likely to succeed.
All of this means that the losers from skin-in-the-game proposals end up being students who have less academic preparation and who come from underresourced school districts. We actually end up creating undermatching by putting greater pressure on colleges to pick “winners” and discouraging them from taking chances on individuals who may benefit the most from the type of education they offer.
It’s also likely to hurt institutions with open admissions policies and that currently enroll larger percentages of minority and nontraditional students. Community colleges, with their limited state budgets and high transfer rates, would suffer most, but so would any college drawing large populations of students from disadvantaged communities. In the long run, those institutions could face unsustainable financial and reputational costs.
There’s certainly a place for risk sharing in higher education, which is why institutions currently pay the real financial costs I described earlier. But if what we care about is making institutions more responsive to students’ long-run needs and expectations, then the solution lies in policies and practices that make such goals their focus.
Income-Share Agreements (ISAs) -- whereby colleges finance their students’ education in return for a fractional share of those students’ future income -- are a good example. They create not only financial penalties but also financial rewards for institutions that help students achieve long-term, sustained success. Driving more institutional revenues through ISA-style agreements also discourages the kinds of deceptive marketing practices that policy makers believe institutions engage in since colleges and universities would, over time, end up having to financially absorb the costs of misrepresenting their programs’ job placement prospects.
The fact is that it’s easy to think that simply imposing penalties on bad actors will fix the problem, yet the logic has to be there to justify the approach. The basis on which risk sharing proposals today are being crafted doesn’t meet the standards of sound policy. We owe it to both colleges and students to craft policies that work toward, not against, the system’s overall objectives.
Carlo Salerno is a Washington, D.C.-based education economist and private consultant.
Chicago State University told 300 nonfaculty employees on Friday that their jobs had been eliminated, The Chicago Tribune reported. Chicago State has been among the public colleges in Illinois most vulnerable to the state never having adopted a full budget for the current fiscal year, and officials said that a minimal appropriation last week would not go far enough. The cuts include senior administrators and people in just about every job category.
Yesterday, the University of Idaho, where I am the president, accepted an invitation to join the Big Sky Conference, starting in fall 2018. The Sun Belt Conference, our current home in the National Collegiate Athletic Association's Football Bowl Subdivision, elected not to renew our membership after 2017.
Faced with the option to play as an independent in FBS, awaiting conference affiliation, or join the Big Sky, a Football Championship Subdivision league where we would gain full membership, we have chosen the road that we believe positions the football program and, importantly, the entire university, for long-term success.
Some UI alumni and supporters do not agree that the FCS is our best option. Many passionate Vandals view our place in FBS as a mark of our institution’s “prestige” and “relevance.” The University of Idaho is our state’s land-grant university, the unquestioned statewide leader in higher education.
Success on the football field should complement the prestige and relevance of our academic institution. But football affiliation or performance should not define prestige and relevance. The impact of our institution should define us, as measured by the entire experience for our student body, including our athletes; by academic excellence across the university; by sustained research, scholarly activity and creative success; and by deep engagement with communities and partnerships with industry.
Why should my university's decision about what conference to play in matter to anybody outside our institution? Because I think our situation has potential implications for dozens of universities that play big-time college football and says a lot about the state of college athletics.
This is an unprecedented move in college athletics, perhaps most similar to the University of Chicago opting out of the Big Ten in 1946. But a decision needed to be made, and made now. It is the best move for our university, and for our athletics program as part of our total university experience. The University of Idaho chooses very consciously, as the University of Chicago chose so long ago, an appropriate place for its athletic programs.
The college athletics landscape faces many challenges -- litigation about use of likeness, fundamental questions about compensation of athletes, concerns about academic integrity. The enormous revenues involved in premier events like the college football playoff and the NCAA Division I basketball tournament, as well as the growing “arms race” in major college athletics, raise many questions about college athletics.
In general, we have seen a steady progression toward higher levels of expenditure and competition -- moves from Division II to Division I, from FCS to FBS, and to ever higher expenditures by premier programs.
UI moved to the FBS level 20 years ago. Since then, we have been affiliated with four different conferences and competed as an independent. And in that time, college football expenditures have increased, and rules, such as the full cost of attendance and the number of teams required for a championship, have changed. These changes should motivate other higher education institutions to reconsider the important role of athletics.
The University of Idaho has been one of the lowest-resourced athletics programs competing at the FBS level. Despite two bowl appearances in our 20 years of FBS competition, we have had very limited success on the football field, while we have had considerable success in other sports.
Nonrenewal in the Sun Belt caused us to consider how we could continue successfully in FBS football. Nonrenewal also caused us to focus on what motivates us to participate in college athletics. Our conclusion was athletics improves UI’s visibility and provides a great shared experience for fans and students as well as opportunity and valuable experience for our student-athletes.
First, we considered whether we could compete as an independent, which we did in 2013. Few, including our fans, would argue that an independent schedule suits an institution our size in a small media market with a limited national reputation. Competing as an independent would not allow Idaho to develop rivalries; independent schedules change yearly. Recruiting to such uncertainty would be difficult. To replace lost conference revenue, Idaho would have had to play three guarantee games, in which powerhouse teams pay big fees to other teams to travel to play them. Neither the student-athlete nor the fan experience seemed desirable as an independent.
Our second consideration was seeking affiliation with a Group of 5 conference other than the Sun Belt. The Group of 5 are the five smaller, nonautonomous conferences (in contrast to the so-called Power 5 conferences): American Athletic Conference, Conference USA, Mid-American Conference, Mountain West Conference and Sun Belt Conference. Most made little geographic sense or offered no traditional rivalries for us. Initial inquiries revealed little receptivity; conferences wondered why they would bring in a team with limited competitive success and no other clear ties.
Nevertheless, should we pursue conference affiliation, which conference makes geographic and institutional sense and what financial resources would be required to make us competitive in Group of 5 football? From a geographic perspective, the Mountain West Conference would be most desirable, but the average expenditures in that league, $38 million, are twice that of Idaho at $19 million, and literally price us out.
More typical Group of 5 expenditures, such as $29 million in the Mid-American Conference or Conference USA, still far exceed those at Idaho. In contrast, Idaho athletic expenditures are typical of Big Sky schools. Our expenditures are already subsidized by our students (though to a lesser extent than at many universities), and that subsidy is limited by our State Board of Education. Should we commit to major additional expenditures from students or donors in order to seek uncertain affiliation?
As president, I asked: At what cost, FBS? We must consider the role of athletics in the institutionwide context. Athletics complements higher education in many ways. Athletes can excel in competition, succeed as students and grow as leaders. Gallup data, for example, suggest that many college athletes are prized by employers for their ability to focus and follow through on tasks and responsibilities.
All of these qualities will be nurtured in the Big Sky Conference -- as they are for participants in that conference from our other sports, such as our conference champion (and NCAA Tournament participant) women’s basketball team. If the benefits to student-athletes continue, if our fans can enjoy realistic competition, why should we continue in the FBS arms race simply to chase a small share of the revenue now accruing to Group of 5 universities from the college football playoff? Instead, we will plan for success as an FCS affiliate.
This is a reset for our football program. We believe Big Sky football will be positive for our athletes and position them to succeed on the field -- our head football coach and I expect Idaho to compete for an FCS championship in 2018. I think our fans will benefit immensely, with opportunities to cultivate meaningful regional rivalries with similar institutions, many within a day’s drive.
We can and will create an outstanding student-athlete and communitywide experience around our program, a vibrant football culture that is a great front porch for Idaho’s leading, national research university, a draw for future students and a continued source of pride for current students. And we can do it in a way that does not constrain the university and does not distract from our core mission.
Idaho chooses to leave the football arms race and focus on excellence in competition and academics. I expect success in football in the coming years, as we conclude our Sun Belt participation and find sustained excellence in the Big Sky Conference. We will tell that story near and far. But the impact of our institution is best represented by our 100,000 proud and passionate alumni whose lives were transformed by the experiences they had at the University of Idaho.