Tommy Curry discusses new book on how critical theory has ignored realities of black maleness

Tommy Curry, the philosopher at Texas A&M whose comments on race set off a furor, discusses his new book on how critical theory has ignored the realities of black maleness.

Philosophy journal apologizes for symposium on Black Lives Matter written without black people


Political philosophy journal, subject of two scathing open letters, apologizes for lack of black authors.

Philosophy professors at St. Thomas in Houston, their contracts late, fear for their jobs

St. Thomas in Houston has held back reappointment notices for philosophy professors -- even those with tenure -- amid debates over budget and the curriculum.

The real damage done by the flare-up over a philosopher's journal article (essay)

An extraordinary and, I believe, unprecedented set of events in recent weeks has raised issues of freedom of speech, the integrity of peer review and (in my view) the credibility of the academy as a place for reasoned debate and the free exchange of ideas.

A quick summary. Rebecca Tuvel, a tenure-track assistant professor of philosophy at Rhodes College, a private liberal arts college in Memphis, Tenn., published an article entitled “In Defense of Transracialism” in Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy. The article explores whether there might be parallels between being transgender and being transracial, focusing specifically on the well-known case of Rachel Dolezal, who is white but presented herself as black for many years.

Tuvel’s argument is that the very same reasons that might justify an individual’s decision to change sexes could also be used to justify an individual’s decision to change races -- so if one is committed to the acceptability of the former (as Tuvel herself is), then one would be committed to the acceptability of the latter.

Shortly after the paper was published in the spring 2017 edition of Hypatia, an open letter with signatures but no author appeared on the internet soliciting further signatures. The letter called for Tuvel’s paper to be retracted by the journal, stating that “its continued availability causes further harm.”

This open letter is now closed to further signatures and has been sent to the editor of Hypatia. While the open letter was still circulating, a statement appeared on the Hypatia website repudiating the article and making multiple references to the harms caused by the article’s publication. The statement has no signatures but is credited to “A majority of the Hypatia board of associate editors.”

This is not the place to discuss the merits or otherwise of Tuvel’s article, which I would encourage you to read (it is clearly written, and pleasantly free of jargon) before reading the open letter and the statement. There is a persuasive analysis of the weakness of the complaints made in the open letter in this article by Jesse Singal in New York magazine. At a minimum, Tuvel appears to have been significantly misrepresented.

I want to explore a much more general issue raised by this whole affair. This has to do with concept of harm, which keeps being raised. The main charge against Tuvel is that the very existence and availability of her paper causes harm to various groups, most specifically to members of the transgender community. This is a puzzling and contentious claim that deserves serious reflection.

The editorial board statement specifically refers to “the harm caused by the fact of the article’s publication.” As the concept of harm is standardly used in legal contexts, this would be a tough claim to defend. It is certainly possible for someone to suffer material or tangible loss, injury, or damage as a consequence of a 15-page article being published in an academic journal. The article might be libelous, for example. But there is no such charge here. The only individual mentioned by name besides Rachel Dolezal is Caitlyn Jenner, and it seems implausible to say that Tuvel has harmed Jenner by “deadnaming” her (i.e., using her birth name), given how public Jenner has been about her personal history.

The authors of the editorial board statement have nothing to say about how they understand harm. This already should give pause for thought. Philosophers, whatever their methodological orientation or training, usually pride themselves on sensitivity to how words and concepts are used. This makes it odd to see no attention being paid to how they are understanding this key concept of harm, which is central to many areas in legal and moral philosophy.

But the statement does clarify what the authors believe has caused the harm: “Perhaps most fundamentally, to compare ethically the lived experience of trans people (from a distinctly external perspective) primarily to a single example of a white person claiming to have adopted a black identity creates an equivalency that fails to recognize the history of racial appropriation, while also associating trans people with racial appropriation.”

This is quite plainly a mischaracterization of what Tuvel is trying to do (as a quick read of her abstract will show). But leaving that aside, the quote shows that the concept of harm has been twisted beyond all recognition. Making a comparison is simply making a comparison -- it is to look at two or more phenomena and identify respects in which they are similar and respects in which they are dissimilar.

Such a comparison can be correct or incorrect. But how can simply making a comparison in itself cause a harm, if it is not explicitly defamatory?

Surely something else has to happen for harm to occur. Most obviously, the comparison might cause someone to behave in a way that brings about some sort of injury to a specific individual or group, for example. But then, in order to substantiate an accusation of harm, Tuvel’s accusers need to explain how her juxtaposition, in a single article, of transgender people and Rachel Dolezal might reasonably be expected to have this effect.

What I find most troubling about this whole business is that none of the signatories of the open letter or anonymous authors of the editorial board statement (I say anonymous because it came only from a majority of the editorial board, thus leaving it an open question whether any given member signed it) appears to feel the need to provide any reasons for thinking that harm or injury will occur as a result of Tuvel’s article.

There may indeed be some argument to be made here. But nobody is attempting to make it, or apparently recognizing that it needs to be made. Innuendo takes the place of argument. Name-calling replaces evidence. This is simply an abnegation of basic academic values, underwritten by failure to explain the relevant concept of harm (or how it is being differentiated from offense in this case).

Still, there are genuine harms here (in the genuine, old-fashioned, legal sense). The behavior of the open letter signatories and the anonymous editorial board members has already led to clear and identifiable injury and loss, and will continue to do so.

The first injured party is, of course, Tuvel, whose academic reputation has been publicly dragged through the mud and who has been personally vilified. As a former dean, I can only imagine the problems that this episode will cause for her tenure case and future career prospects. A number of people have suggested that she has a case for defamation, and that certainly seems plausible.

Hypatia is the second injured party. It is hard to see how this journal can retain academic credibility, after its editorial board has publicly repudiated its own peer reviewers and reviewing practices. Or at least not until all the anonymous authors of the statement have resigned.

Third in line is the philosophical community, which is suffering multiple harms. This is definitely a case where there is such a thing as bad publicity -- as you might imagine, it’s open season on social media, and the incident has been widely and unsympathetically reported in the press. But one also needs to take into account the chilling effect within the discipline of seeing a vulnerable member of the community publicly shamed by a group that will avoid accountability (unless the legal system intervenes).

And finally, harm has been done to the academic community in general, and the humanities in particular. At a time of widespread public distrust of universities, with hostility to the very idea of a liberal education deeply entrenched in the White House and national and state legislatures, we all suffer an injury when the worst stereotypes about academics seem to be confirmed.

All of these genuine and significant harms were completely foreseeable. It is a mystery to me why Tuvel’s accusers have taken no account of them, choosing instead to persecute a junior colleague on the basis of unsubstantiated claims about unspecified harms.

José Luis Bermúdez is a professor of philosophy at Texas A&M University.

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Author discusses new book on attacks on philosophers during Cold War

Author discusses his new book about why philosophers were an early target of the Cold War Red scare.

Land-grant universities can reinvigorate philosophy's focus on societal challenges (essay)

In recent years, we’ve seen a surge of articles, essays and blog posts by professional philosophers on the future of philosophy. While it isn’t surprising that people who reflect professionally would reflect on the future of their profession, this surge is symptomatic of a deeper anxiety that some philosophers, and many humanists, have felt in the modern, outcome-oriented academy.

Some of the reflections are more conservative, defending the status quo and arguing that philosophy is just as strong, if not stronger, than it ever was (e.g., Scott Soames, “Philosophy’s True Home”). Others are more progressive, contending that the profession must be diversified if it is to be capable of responding to the complex challenges of a pluralistic world (e.g., Minna Salami, “Philosophy has to be about more than just white men”).

Such anxieties are not unfounded. The university’s role in a globally interconnected world is changing, and we need to be responsive to that change. Without sustained, intentional efforts to engage the challenges of a global public, philosophy will languish.

In a New York Times essay, Robert Frodeman and Adam Briggle argue that philosophy as an endeavor lost its way when, in an effort to be integrated into the modern research university, it sought to establish itself as a specialized discipline alongside other disciplines. Although controversial, their position rightly identifies a source of philosophy’s current crisis: to turn inward to disciplinary concerns is to turn away from the questions that the world asks of us.

Before its emergence as a department within the modern research institution, philosophy had in fact long been deeply engaged with the world. At its heart, philosophy is a broad human activity requiring a heightened attunement to the environment we inhabit and a cultivated ability to respond to complexity with nuance and a sense for what is just. If it sacrificed this broader scope of concern as a price of legitimacy in the modern research university, then the “purified” discipline of philosophy was indeed significantly different from the embedded practice of gadflies and other lovers of wisdom. Philosophy, disciplined in this way, is not well positioned to live up to the public commitments it has embodied from its earliest beginnings.

But not all modern research universities are the same. Consider, in particular, how philosophy has taken root in the American land-grant universities that emerged in the 19th century to provide all citizens with access to higher education, democratizing an institution that had been available only to a select few. The land-grant mission directs all of higher education, including philosophy, to the lived realities of the world, emphasizing our shared responsibility to support citizen leaders in grappling with difficult challenges from a diversity of perspectives.

To the extent that philosophy lost its way by turning inward, perhaps it can find its way again in the contemporary public land-grant university by returning to an outward focus that addresses the most complex and intractable challenges of our time. Unlike traditional research universities or, for that matter, liberal arts colleges and other four-year institutions, land-grant universities are charged with the responsibility of reaching out to their states and to the broader regions in which they are situated. Further, they maintain statewide extension networks that support the flow of knowledge and information with the public.

In this context, philosophy can draw on its deepest historical roots as a publicly engaged activity while cultivating the synthesis of a wide range of disciplinary perspectives. Our vision of a philosophy at home in the public land-grant university requires the disciplinary pursuit of a progressive research agenda that emphasizes democratic and inclusive public engagement with real-world issues, such as food security, climate change and environmental justice.

To speak of the disciplinary pursuit of a progressive, inclusive and democratic research agenda is to affirm both the theoretical (and often esoteric) accomplishments of philosophy as an academic discipline and the imperative to be responsive to the world we share. It is a call for an engaged philosophy that recognizes that theory is best informed by practice and that practice is always enriched by theory -- such that the segregation of the two always results in the impoverishment of both.

So understood, engaged philosophy is different from a common conception of applied philosophy, according to which one works out the theory in isolation from the messiness of the real world into which it is then deployed. This conception encourages the antidemocratic view that academic philosophers work out solutions on their own and then merely deliver them to the masses; it is a renunciation of the dialogue that enriches the work. By contrast, engaged philosophy emphasizes the coordination of a broad range of voices, which secures responsiveness to complexity, sensitivity to differences in core values and beliefs, and a robust commitment to justice.

Philosophy has a well-earned reputation for analysis, but the practice of engaged philosophy in the land-grant context requires a cultivated capacity for synthesis -- of philosophical approaches, of philosophy with other academic disciplines and of academic with nonacademic perspectives. This capacity entails commitment to two key principles.

First, engaged philosophy is committed to cross-disciplinary research, understood as including both interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary activity. Complex problems such as food security and environmental justice have important conceptual and empirical dimensions that require input from a wide range of other disciplines; at the same time, they are problems for people outside the academy, and any adequate response will require input from nonacademic stakeholders. Philosophers can and should play a fundamental role in these cross-disciplinary responses, illuminating the nature of the values in play and providing common ground that facilitates the integration of the various perspectives, both inside and outside the academy. But we should also always come prepared to listen and learn, so our own disciplinary approach is enriched by our engagement with others as we respond to the challenges we face. For example, the Michigan State University-based Toolbox Project uses philosophical concepts and methods to facilitate communication and collaboration in cross-disciplinary projects, ranging from work on transplant rejection in pediatric patients, oil and gas inputs into the Gulf of Mexico, and climate resiliency in western Michigan.

Second, engaged philosophy is committed to inclusivity. A commitment to cross-disciplinary research entails inclusivity in the research response, but research represents only one mode of engagement. Sustainable and just responses to complex social problems require cultivating the habits of inclusive practice and solidarity on a broad scale. This involves ensuring the participation of those who are affected by the problem in all stages of the research process, as well as before research begins and after it concludes. Unless engaged philosophers, and university researchers more generally, work shoulder to shoulder with activists and community members on efforts such as those that involve environmental justice, climate policy and indigenous peoples, the responses they develop will lack the trust and respect needed to ensure long-term viability.

But the habits of inclusive practice must not be cultivated exclusively in philosophy’s external relationships. They must also be embodied in the practices of academic philosophy itself. This means that a much more inclusive understanding of what “counts as” philosophy and of who “looks like” a philosopher is required. Philosophy has been accused of being a monoculture, both in terms of its thematic foci and its demographic composition. Engagement can reveal new contexts for philosophical work, increasing the diversity of philosophical problems and of the philosophical practitioners who engage them.

Just as universities must adapt to remain relevant and accountable in a changing world, so too must the disciplines that give academic depth to them. The anxiety of philosophers is symptomatic of a broader concern about our role in this changing institutional context. But the symptoms themselves point to possible remedies. Specifically, a more inclusive philosophy profession that acknowledges its potential as a partner in cross-disciplinary efforts could model a broader and more diverse understanding of academic excellence -- one rooted in publicly engaged initiatives that enrich the human experience.

Although land-grant universities have their own fraught histories, for the land granted was gained through the colonization of indigenous peoples, they remain ideal institutional sites in which to realize this synthetic vision, because they provide the infrastructure and the resources necessary to advance these commitments to an inclusive and engaged philosophy. The humanities more broadly, and philosophy in particular, are well positioned in the land-grant university to catalyze initiatives that can deepen our shared responses to the most difficult challenges we face.

Christopher P. Long is dean of the College of Arts and Letters and professor of philosophy at Michigan State University, and Michael O’Rourke is professor of philosophy and faculty in AgBioResearch at the university.

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Philosophy association issues statement against bullying

Philosophy association issues statement against the way some scholars are being treated. Some praise the effort. Others fear it could limit free expression.

Northwestern philosophy professor resigns during termination hearing over sexual harassment findings

In an unexpected move, a Northwestern professor found guilty of sexual harassment resigns during his termination hearing.

Rutgers professor convicted of sexually assaulting a disabled man

The Anna Stubblefield case captivated academics when news first broke. But with her conviction of sexual assault of an intellectually disabled man, scholars disagree as to significance of case for disability studies.

Essay on the problems with philosophy in academe

In 1917 John Dewey published “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy.” The essay consists of a reflection on the role of philosophy in early 20th century American life, expressing Dewey’s concern that philosophy had become antiquated, “sidetracked from the main currents of contemporary life,” too much the domain of professionals and adepts. While taking pains to note that the classic questions of philosophy make contributions to culture both past and present, Dewey felt that the topics being raised by professional philosophers were too often “discussed mainly because they have been discussed rather than because contemporary conditions of life suggest them.”

Dewey soon traveled to China, where he delivered nearly 200 lectures on education and democracy to large crowds across a two-year stay. Back in America Dewey commented on the public questions of the day, a role that he inhabited until his death in 1952. Since then, however, professional philosophers have followed W.V.O. Quine’s path in treating philosophy as a technical exercise of no particular interest to the layman:

Think of organic chemistry; I recognize its importance, but I am not curious about it, nor do I see why the layman should care about much of what concerns me in philosophy.

But is philosophy really analogous to chemistry, a domain of expertise populated by specialists? Or are philosophical questions part and parcel of everyone’s life, as far from a specialist’s tasks as anything can be?

Nearly 100 years after Dewey’s essay, it’s time for another reconstruction of philosophy.


While it is possible to point to philosophers who work with (rather than merely talk about) the concerns of non-philosophers, among the mass of philosophers societal irrelevance is often treated as a sign of intellectual seriousness.

This is a shame, since we are surrounded by phenomena crying out for philosophic reflection. Today we are constantly confronted by philosophic questions, in many cases created by advances in science and technology. Open your computer and you can find thoughtful exploration of issues as varied as the creation of autonomous killing machines, the loss of privacy in a digital age, the remaking of friendship via Facebook, and the refashioning of human nature via biotechnology. In this sense philosophy abounds. But professional philosophers have remained largely on the margins of this growing cultural conversation.

It needn’t be this way. Take the subject matter of metaphysics. Every philosophy department teaches courses in metaphysics. But how is the subject handled? As evidenced by a sample of university syllabuses posted online, metaphysics classes are overwhelmingly exercises in professional philosophy. Just as Dewey complained, classes begin from the concerns of philosophers rather than from contemporary problems. This can be seen in the leading textbooks. Consider as magisterial a source as the Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Loux and Zimmerman, eds. Their introduction begins so:

Its detractors often characterize analytical philosophy as anti-metaphysical. After all, we are told, it was born at the hands of Moore and Russell, who were reacting against the metaphysical systems of idealists like Bosanquet and Bradley…

The discussion is entirely framed in terms of the disciplinary concerns of philosophy – and only 20th century analytic philosophy at that. We find no reference to people’s actual lives, to the metaphysical issues tied to the births and transformations and deaths that we all endure, no acknowledgement that questions of metaphysics involve some of the most intimate and transcendent questions of our lives. Instead, metaphysics is a tale told in terms of professionals: Moore and Russell, Bosanquet and Bradley, Quine and Lewis.

We are not claiming that the matters addressed by such essays are insignificant. But it takes one adept in philosophy to extract the nut of existential meaning from the disciplinary shell. No wonder even the best students walk away.

Why do philosophers begin with insider topics when issues laden with metaphysics are in the news every day? The May 25, 2014 issue of The Washington Post describes a patient taking heart pills that include ingestible chips: the chips link up with her computer so that she and her doctor can see that she has taken her medicine. The story also describes soon-to-be marketed nanosensors that live in the bloodstream and will be able to spot the signs of a heart attack before it occurs. These are issues that could fall under “Existence and Identity,” one of the sections of the Oxford Handbook: at stake here are metaphysical questions about the nature of self and the boundary between organism and machine.

This needs to change, for the health of our culture, and for the health of philosophy itself. Unless professional philosophy embraces and institutionalizes an engaged approach to philosophizing, working alongside other disciplines and abroad in the world at large, it will become a casualty of history.


In our opinion, the single greatest impediment to philosophy’s greater relevance is the institutional situation of philosophy. The early 20th century research university disciplined philosophers, placing them in departments, where they wrote for and were judged by their disciplinary peers. Oddly, this change was unremarked upon, or was treated as simply the professionalization of another academic field of research. It continues to be passed over in silence today. Like Moliere’s Bourgeois Gentleman, who did not know that he had been speaking prose, philosophers seem innocent of the fact that they have been doing disciplinary philosophy, or that one might have reasons to object to this fact. And so even when their subject matter consists of something of real significance to the wider world, philosophers typically discuss the topic in a way that precludes the active interest of and involvement by non-philosophers.

Philosophers view themselves as critical thinkers par excellence who have been trained to question everything; but they have overlooked the institutional arrangements that govern their lives. The department is seen as a neutral space from which thought germinates, not itself the object of reflection. One finds no exploration of the effects that disciplining might have had on philosophical theorizing, or of where else philosophers could be housed, or of how philosophers, by being located elsewhere, might have developed alternative accounts of the world or have come up with new ways of philosophizing. In fact, the epistemic implications of the current institutional housing of philosophy are profound.

Philosophers once recognized that there is something problematic about treating philosophy as simply one discipline alongside the others. It was once understood that in addition to fine-grained analyses philosophy offered perspectives that undergirded, capped off, or synthesized the work of other disciplines such as physics or biology, and then connected those insights to our larger concerns. Such work lost favor in the 20th century – dismissed as Weltanschauung philosophy by analytic philosophers, and as foundationalism by continental philosophers. But reopen this perspective and questions abound: if philosophy is not, or not exclusively a regional ontology, why are philosophers housed within one region of the university?

Why is peer-reviewed scholarship the sole standard for judging philosophic work, rather than also the effects that such work has on the larger world? And why is there only one social role for those with Ph.D.s in philosophy – namely, to talk to other Ph.D.s in philosophy?


Philosophers may have ignored their institutional placement, but for other disciplines critical reflection on the structures of knowledge production has become par for the course. Perhaps the most important site for such analysis is the interdisciplinary field of science, technology, and society studies (STS). One influential book in STS – Gibbons et al.’s 1994 The New Production of Knowledge – chronicles the shift in late 20th century science from “Mode 1” to “Mode 2” knowledge production. Mode 1 is academic, investigator-initiated, and discipline-based. By contrast, Mode 2 knowledge production is context-driven, problem-focused, and interdisciplinary. This framework is a good rough sketch of our basic point: we are tracing and promoting the 21st century development of Mode 2 philosophy.

But make no mistake. We are pluralists on this point. We believe Mode 1 or disciplinary scholarship should continue to have a central place in philosophy. But Mode 1 thinking needs to be counter-balanced by an equal focus within the philosophical community on conducting work that is socially engaged. In part this is simply recognizing a new reality: increasingly society is demanding that academics demonstrate their broader relevance. This demand has so far largely skipped over philosophy and the humanities, but this is unlikely to remain the case for much longer. Philosophy needs to demonstrate its bona fides by showing how it can make timely and effective contributions to contemporary debates. We believe that this is best done in a way that also shows that Mode 2 philosophizing is enriched by the insights of Mode 1 or traditional philosophy. 

While Mode 1 philosophy is still the reigning orthodoxy, there is a growing heterodoxy within the ranks of philosophers, sometimes lumped under the title of “public philosophy.” We call our own version of Mode 2 work “field philosophy.” There are a number of similar approaches in areas such as environmental justice, critical race theory, feminism, and bioethics that we recognize as allies. We celebrate these diverse approaches to Mode 2 philosophizing, whether they go by the name of ‘public’, ‘applied’, or by some other title. But we believe that the lack of thought given to the institutional dimensions of philosophizing has limited the effectiveness of this work. A new philosophical practice, where philosophers work in real time with a variety of audiences and stakeholders, will lead to new theoretical forms of philosophy – once we break the stranglehold that disciplinary norms have upon the profession.

It will take a community to institutionalize Mode 2 practices. As it stands now, heterodox practitioners (however they self-identify) exist on the margins and lead professional lives that run against the grain. As the feminist public philosopher Linda Martín Alcoff notes, many Mode 2 philosophers try to “walk a fine line between responsiveness to community needs and employment survival, pushing the boundaries of academic respectability even while trying to establish their credentials in conventional ways." It is these “conventional ways” that must change. We have to invent a philosophy where responsiveness to community needs (not just disciplinary interests and imperatives) is an integral part of one’s employment and is viewed as academically respectable.

In practice, this will require many changes, from revised promotion and tenure criteria to alternative metrics for excellence and impact. As these changes are implemented, it will be important to consider at what point the chasm has been reduced to a suitable-sized gap. After all, we don’t want to eliminate the space between philosophy and society altogether. Socrates was engaged, but still an outsider. He certainly was no pundit looking to score the most outrageous sound bite and rack up the most “likes” on Facebook. We need a people’s philosophy that reserves every right to be unpopular.


Robert Frodeman is a professor of philosophy and religion studies at North Texas and director of its Center for the Study of Interdisciplinarity. Adam Briggle is an associate professor of philosophy and religion studies at the University of North Texas.

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