Presses

Kentucky governor seeks to kill state's university press

Kentucky press, which serves all the public institutions and some private colleges in the state, is noted for books on history, Appalachia and its home state.

Duquesne University Press to shut down later this year

The 90-year-old university press will close its doors this year after Duquesne decided to cut its funding.

An examination of whether academic journal rankings are being manipulated (essay)

Are editors manipulating citation scores in order to inflate the status of their publications? Are they corrupting the rankings of scholarly journals?

While any allegations about cheating or other academic chicanery are cause for concern, journal rankings to date continue to offer one rough but useful source of information to a wide variety of audiences.

Journal rankings help authors to answer the omnipresent question “Where to publish?” Tenure review committees also use rankings as evidence for visibility, recognition and even quality in the academic review process, especially for junior candidates. For them, journal ranking becomes a proxy when other, more direct measures of recognition and quality are not available. Given that many candidates for tenure have recent publications, journal rankings become a surrogate measure for the eventual visibility of that research.

Yet it is easy to rely unduly on quantitative rating scores. The trouble arises when journal rankings becomes a stand-in for the quality of the research. In many fields, research quality is a multifaceted concept that is not reducible to a single quantitative metric. For example, imposing a single rule -- for example, that top-quartile journals count as “high-quality” journals while others do not -- assigns more weight to journal rankings than they deserve and generates the temptation to inflate journals’ scores.

In an editorial in the journal Research Policy, editor Ben R. Martin voiced his concern that the manipulation of journal impact factors undermines the validity of Thompson/Reuters Journal Citation Reports (JCR). He concludes that “… in light of the ever more devious ruses of editors, the JIF [journal impact factor] indicator has lost most of its credibility.” A journal’s impact factor represents the average number of citations per article. The standard, one-year impact factor is calculated by summing up citations to articles published in a journal within the last year, divided by the number of articles published.

I share the suspicion and unease that many academics feel about excessive reliance on journal impact scores for the purposes of academic evaluation and tenure decisions. Yet, while I am not a fan of impact scores calculated over a one-year period, my research on journal rankings leads me to conclude that Martin’s concerns are overstated.

The two main sources of manipulation that Martin discusses are coercive citations (whereby editors require authors to add citations to the journal in question) and creating a queue of online articles, which artificially inflates the number of citations per published article. While any intentional manipulation of journal rankings is reprehensible, to date the overall effect of this type of behavior in practice is quite limited. I arrive at this sanguine conclusion after exploring a variety of indexes and data sources in a forthcoming assessment of journals in my own field of sociology.

A clear hierarchy of journals in sociology is evident no matter what data source (Web of Science or Google Scholar) one uses. There is a great degree of commonality across measures in describing this gradient, even though many low-ranked journals are bunched together with quite similar scores. Manipulation of one-year data has not altered the overall picture a great deal (at least not yet) because five-year measures yield very similar rankings. And even to manipulate the one-year impact factor, editors would have to insist that new authors cite the most recently published articles in that journal.

Substantively, I doubt that much manipulation in sociology journals occurs because, first, the raw scores have not inflated over time and second, the relative ranking of more than 100 journals has been quite steady. Individual journals here and there have moved up and down slightly, but these changes are much more readily attributable to changes in the level of scholarly interest in particular subfields and editorial choices than to any individual editor’s efforts to game the system.

The main reason I discount concerns about manipulation is that different approaches to journal rankings produce a broadly similar picture of inequality. In my study, I use Google Scholar data to calculate the h-index for journals. This measure focuses on the top-cited articles over an extended time period rather than the average citation in a short time frame. It would not be easy for journal editors to manipulate this measure, even if they were aware of it its use.

Let’s take citations to Martin’s own journal, Research Policy, as an example. I obtain an h of 246 over the period from 2000 to 2015. That means that 246 articles cited at least 246 times have been published in this journal during this time frame. That is an impressive score, exceeding the visibility of the American Economic Review (h=227 over the same time period) and the American Sociological Review (h=162). (I calculated all figures with A. W. Harzing’s 2015 Publish or Perish software using Google Scholar data.)

The h statistics just cited reflect the remarkable visibility of these leading journals. It would be quite difficult to develop strategies to artificially generate enough citations to significantly alter those scores. I prefer the use of h as a measure because it attempts to capture the skewed nature of scientific scholarship. Yet the fact remains that the overall hierarchy of journals is broadly similar whether the h-index or the conventional impact factor is used.

In their 2012 study, Allen W. Wilhite and Eric A. Fong present data of concern regarding the prevalence of coercive citations. The pattern of coercive citation was particularly pronounced in lower-tier journals, and especially in the field of business and management. Yet again, I doubt that the overall journal regime is appreciably altered by dubious editorial gaming stratagems. Wilhite and Fong identify eight journals in which this practice might be common enough to matter (more than 10 reports of coercive rankings), but none of those journals has made its way into the top tier in the field (as measured in the JCR standings). In other words, by dint of a relentless and long-term commitment to manipulation, some third-quartile journals might be able to inch their way into the second quartile by manipulating scores, but that is unlikely to alter the overall contours of the field.

If a significant group of low-visibility journals undertook a major effort to increase their citations, that would make them as a group harder to distinguish from the top journals. In the field of sociology, there is no indication that middle- and lower-tier journals are narrowing the distance from the most frequently cited journals. Indeed, this enduring gap is itself interesting, in that it suggests that search engines are not increasing the visibility of journals to which few individuals subscribe.

At the same time, we need to remember that journal rankings serve as only a rough proxy for visibility and recognition of individual papers. In other words, articles published within the same journal will vary in how often they are cited. In my analysis of 140 sociology journals over the period from 2010 to 2014, most of the 10 most frequently cited papers were not published in the top-ranked journals. Thus, substantial variability in visibility (citations) within journals coexists with broadly stable patterns of inequality between journals.

In addition, the list of top-cited articles is largely impervious to self-citation. It is simply too difficult to cite oneself enough to vault one’s research into this echelon on visibility. For example, the top 10 cited journal articles in sociology from 2010 to 2014 had 400 or more citations. To catapult one’s own paper into this citation stratosphere would require publishing hundreds of papers in just a few years. No one could possibly publish frequently enough and cite themselves regularly enough to affect inclusion in the list of top-cited papers. And anyone prolific enough to implement such a strategy would not need to game the system.

Authors have a natural desire to seek outlets that will enhance the visibility of their research. In the field of sociology, that involves a choice of pursuing the most selective generalist journals, the top journals in each specialty area within the field, the second-tier generalist journals and then other remaining specialty outlets and interdisciplinary journals. The use of journal ranking data may be marginally useful in informing such choices. Other important factors include each journal’s particular focus, its selectivity, turnaround time, policies regarding second and third rounds of revisions, and so on.

Journal rankings are likely to remain with us because such rankings are of interest to so many parties, as research by Wendy Nelson Espeland and Michael Sauder suggests, even while their value is likely to remain contested. Perhaps a clearer recognition of the imprecision inherent in journal rankings will mean that they will be used judiciously, as a complement rather than a substitute for important and difficult academic evaluations. And perhaps the use of a variety of different journal indexes will reduce the temptation to game the system and redirect efforts back toward selecting high-quality research for consideration by the scholarly community.

Jerry A. Jacobs is professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania and former editor of the American Sociological Review.

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Northern Illinois U Press fights to survive after being deemed 'nonessential'

Supporters of academic publishing worry about what Northern Illinois U may decide about a small press that punches above its weight in scholarship.

University of Akron says it hasn't eliminated its university press, but has eliminated all press staff jobs

U of Akron denies killing off its press, even though the university eliminated the jobs of all employees. Many are dubious.

ProQuest acquires Stanford U. spinoff SIPX

The researcher and library service provider makes another investment in simplifying the discovery of scholarly content with the addition of the Silicon Valley-based start-up.

Researchers, university press directors emboldened by Mellon foundation interest in academic publishing

The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation is aggressively funding efforts to support new digital models -- in writing, editing, financing and more.

Essay on ideas about luxury and university presses

So you almost have that book contract in your grasp. You’ve had your most trusted colleagues drop a favorable hint about your work in the ear of the acquisitions editor at the best press in your field. You carefully (and, of course, unobtrusively) stalked said editor at the spring meeting of your disciplinary society, and managed to “accidentally” meet at the drinks reception.

You wrote a follow-up e-mail — not too soon, not too late — with a general query describing your idea and how it fits into the broader publication program at Desirable University Press. And when you received back that warm response — O, happy day! — you observed a decent interval before sending off your polished proposal, on which, of course, you’ve been working ceaselessly for the last six months.

And now you’re refreshing your inbox every five minutes or so, waiting for that hoped-for green light.

Did you ever think — after all your work — that what you were producing was a luxury?

Probably not. All you really want is for the best publisher, whatever that means to you, to publish it; and for your ideas to receive notice in the reviews that matter in your field. Well, you’d probably like your promotion and tenure committee to be impressed, too. Royalties would be nice, but more than anything, you want impact.

Yet maybe you think it should be a luxury, after all the effort and sweat and heartache you’ve invested in it. As far as you’re concerned, it’s pure gold, and should be priced accordingly. You can be sure it will. According to one book provider for university libraries, the average cover price of an academic book now stands at around $90.00 — a few multiples more than the average price of a book.

It’s not just the price that makes scholarly books a luxury. Think about this line from a recent study of luxury goods: “In luxury, quality is assumed, price does not have to be explained rationally; it is the price of the intangibles (history, legend, prestige of the brand)."

That sounds a lot like the system of scholarly publishing we have come to know and love (and/or loathe). It’s exactly the history, legend, prestige of the brand — the welter of such elements as the name of a given press, the backlist of titles in its catalog, the reputation of the institution with which it is (to a greater or lesser degree) affiliated, the grand old stories we tell about the way a certain editor championed a book against a sea of troubles — that gives the whole enterprise a whiff of mystique and nobility. Scholarly publishing, like any other luxury good, is a reputation-driven business producing goods for a select few at high prices, which in turn transmit a signal about the value of the good — and the prestige of the producer.

But as any social psychologist can tell you, reputations are a bad shortcut to reality. On the contrary, they can be a fruitful source of bias — filled with meaning we make instead of content we assess.

If you think about it, it’s surprising that scholarly publishing is — and seemingly should be — a business in which brand reputation is not just operative, but essential. Stories abound of promotion and tenure committees advising candidates of the four or five publishers with which a book they present must be placed — at least if they have hopes of further advancement. But of course to say this is to mistake the brand for the content. After all, scholarly merit is supposed to be a function of, well, merit, not mere reputation. Isn’t it? Aren’t we supposed to read the books, and not merely the spine?

•  •  •

The old chestnut that academic publishing is in a state of crisis may or may not be true; that all depends on your definition of “crisis.” What is certainly true is that the nature of scholarly publishing has changed, in some ways so much that it would scarcely be recognizable to the founding generation of university press directors.

After all, it is only meaningful to distinguish “scholarly publishing” from all other sorts of publishing if it has not just a distinctive content but a distinctive purpose.

The content is indisputably meant to be scholarly work of great merit. Even within a single field disagreements may (and do) arise about exactly what merit is, but no one seriously disputes that the content provided by academic presses is, or ought to be, characterized by a kind of defensible and substantive merit.

That is to say, scholarly publishing — at least in the days American university presses were established — was seen as a way for scholars to communicate their ideas with each other in ways that would not depend, at least not critically, on the market. Exactly because the market would be a poor judge of scholarly merit, producing scholarly work was seen as an extension of institutional mission. Colleges and universities exist not merely to create, but to communicate knowledge; and the social privileges conferred because of that mission (notably, qualification to receive charitable gifts incentivized by the tax code) entail social responsibilities to support both the process and the production of research.

So here’s a thesis. If there truly is a crisis in scholarly publishing, it has arisen from this fundamental first cause: the end of the era in which institutions sponsoring presses saw the publishing of scholarship as something near to the heart of their core mission, and deserving to be supported on those terms. Result: What was never intended to be a system left to the vicissitudes of the market has become exactly that. Scholarly books have become high-priced, prestige-driven luxury goods not by accident, but by forgetfulness.

Symptoms of this shift abound. Presses unable to break even are closed, or severely curtailed, as universities refocus on “strategic priorities." Book prices rise at a rate far higher than inflation in order to cover publishers’ fixed costs as institutional subventions vanish. Authors are chosen not so much on the basis of prize-winning, promising early work but rather because they can command the services of a literary agent.

It doesn’t have to be this way. To solve the crisis we should speak frankly of its causes, and imagine alternatives to received structures. There are three points to keep in view as we invent and test alternatives.

•  Open access doesn’t mean poor quality. The push for open access, an idea received with acute suspicion in some quarters, has come about in no small way as a direct consequence of the predictable failure of a market-based system for scholarly publishing to serve its audience.

As a species we are pretty hardwired to associate cost with value — one reason why luxury goods, for which no rational explanation can suffice, yet exist. That is the hardest challenge for open-access advocates (of which I am one) to overcome; how can something free be trusted? But there is no logical connection between the price (as distinguished from the production cost) of a scholarly work and its merit. Yes, assuring quality is a costly business. But there are other ways of paying those costs than depending on purchase-price revenue.

•  Communicating ideas is (or should be) critical to the mission of all institutions. The relationship between publishing and the institutional mission needs to be reassessed. Real and lasting change in the broken system of scholarly communication cannot be accomplished by publishers, or libraries, alone. Ultimately it will take a critical mass of institutional leaders able to see how abandoning academic presses to the market was, in effect, abdicating a core scholarly responsibility. I am fortunate to work in an institution led by such people, with the result that the revenue on which we will do the expected work of assuring quality and publishing scholarship will be borne by institutional commitments instead of consumers.

•  Disruptive innovation is messy. Changing the revenue model — shifting the source of the revenue from either end of the value chain (purchases by consumers at one end, or “author fees” at the other) to institutional commitments at the center — is made possible by new technologies for distribution (digital publishing). But will also mean the emergence of a new set of ideas for the kinds of institutions that do scholarly publishing.

For one thing, there may well be a larger number of publishers producing a smaller number of works on a focused set of topics. Most of the proposed solutions to the “crisis,” both those offered by publishers and those sponsored by foundations, have been essentially focused on preserving the current demographic profile of university presses. It is not self-evident that this is the only solution. Liberal arts colleges (to cite my own example) have a valuable and distinct contribution to make to the identification of what constitutes “scholarship” — but, with a few admirable exceptions, have been frozen out of the conversation by the sheer volume of production required by a market-dependent system. That can now change.

So, too, digital tools make possible not only different ways of producing work, but different ways of organizing the work of publishers. University presses, by and large, are organized as hierarchical firms — and with good reason; such organizations manage market pressures efficiently. But academic publishing could become much more like a commons, adapting to its own purposes Yochai Benkler’s ideas of commons-based peer production in which the uniting thread is a shared passion for the development and distribution of new ideas among colleagues and peers. Said in different terms, what if the future of academic publishing looked less like the Encyclopædia Britannica, and more like Wikipedia?

Good luck on the book contract. When you get it — and, of course, you will — remember why you got into your field in the first place. It probably wasn’t to produce luxuries, but to create ideas and communicate them to your peers — the same reason I wrote this piece. So when you have an idea for your next book, think about working with a publisher who shares those goals.

 

Mark Edington is director of the Amherst College Press.

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Historians clash over open access movement

Supporters of open access and traditional publishing models clash during the American Historical Association's annual meeting.

Are university presses better off than they were 4 years ago?

Clifford Lynch recently wrote a piece in which he describes the broken promises to libraries surrounding the introduction of e-books. Instead of a cornucopia of books that would be available at lower prices than print and with various new features enabled by digital technology, we have a peculiar situation where many publishers are refusing to sell books to libraries at all, and often when they do indeed sell them, the books are priced higher than their print counterparts and with various new usage restrictions imposed upon them. So the promises of e-books for libraries remain unfulfilled.

Putting aside the question of who made those promises and how they proposed to hold themselves accountable for their fulfillment, Lynch’s comments lead me to wonder if the advent of e-books has been a good or bad thing for university press publishing, a segment in which I have long had a special interest. On balance I would have to say that as dramatic as the introduction of e-books to the academic sector has been, by and large the fortunes of the press world are not appreciably better than they were four years ago -- or six years ago, to begin the count with the launch of the Amazon Kindle, with apologies to Ronald Reagan and his famous (if misleading) four-year formulation. Indeed, university presses seem to be operating under snugger strategic conditions than even a few years ago. E-books haven’t made all that much difference.

Before saying another word, I must make the qualifying remark that there is great diversity among university presses and that generalizations inevitably introduce distortions.  The university presses at Cambridge and Oxford are as large as many commercial firms, possess a global footprint, and manage a broad product portfolio. American presses range from under $1 million in revenue to tens of millions; some publish journals while others do not; and some, despite their small size, are healthily profitable. My comments here put Oxford and Cambridge to the side and talk of the other presses in the aggregate -- that is, there may have been winners and losers among them, but what have their fortunes been as a whole?

University presses have a complex business model, unique in the university world as far as I know, that combines earned revenue with various forms of funding that is not derived from the market place. The earned revenue of these publishers is something of a three-legged stool: books, journals and services. Services can take many forms, but the largest service by far is in the distribution of physical goods on behalf of other, smaller presses. Let’s dig into the earned revenue one leg at a time, putting books last.

1. Services. A number of presses distribute books on behalf of other academic publishers, both domestic and international.  Historically this has been a good business, as distribution is a game of scale and a small press has anything but scale. This service lowers the cost of distribution to the small-press client (that is, in comparison to having to provide this service for themselves) and provides a profit for the larger press providing the service.

Unfortunately, this activity is now under stress. Sales of printed books are not growing and in many instances are declining. This leads to excess capacity at warehouses and slow-moving inventory (partially offset by the introduction of digital SRP -- short-run printing). On top of this is the entrance into the sector of commercial players, who change the competitive landscape. It is difficult to be optimistic about the long-term prospects for this service.

Presses are also seeking to provide other services, especially digital services, but this will be a steep hill to climb.  The problem here is that the competition is everywhere.  Do you want to provide print-on-demand services for third parties? Well, you and a dozen other outfits. How about digital asset management, where the provider warehouses digital files that can be accessed and manipulated by clients?  Well, you and two dozen other outfits. We needn’t get into file conversion, the creation of ebook apps, or pretty much anything digital. The competition is too keen.

Some presses attempt to provide publishing services to other departments within their institutions. This is a good idea (there is no point in having 20 different people trying to figure out how to convert a PDF to an EPUB file), but the scale is small.  Overall, it’s hard to escape the conclusion that income from third-party services will not be an ensured source of funding for presses in the future. And this problem has intensified over the past 4 years–or 6–as print books migrate to digital formats.

2.  Journals.  Journal publishing over all is a very good business for certain large publishers, and it is still a good business for many university presses.  By my estimate, the American presses, taken together, publish about 200 journals; adding Oxford and Cambridge to the mix would add perhaps 600 more. This is out of a universe of approximately 25,000. There is a clear hierarchy in journals publishing. The commercial firms Elsevier, Springer, and John Wiley sit at the top, followed by such firms as Taylor & Francis, Wolters Kluwer, and Sage and the major not-for-profits (e.g., ACS) — and of course Oxford and Cambridge.  Below that group are many university presses and professional societies (e.g., AIP, APS).  Smaller still are many other professional societies, which may have a tiny portfolio of journals.

The problem for university presses is that the journals business is all about scale and the one thing the presses do not have is scale.  Scale permits a publisher to establish a global footprint, to invest in technology, to pay large guarantees to attract professional societies to the roster, and to market the publications into every corner of the marketplace. The journals market is not growing as rapidly as it once did outside of a few notable Gold OA publishers (e.g., PLoS), which in turn has put even greater pressure on publishers to achieve a greater and greater scale, the better to dominate academic library budgets and squeeze out the publications of smaller firms (which are likely in turn to sell out to the larger publishers, thereby increasing the latter publishers’ scale still further, a cycle that is vicious or virtuous depending on which side of the table you sit on).

The race for scale has resulted in the larger publishers poaching the journals formerly handled by many university presses. Thus we have seen a collection of anthropology journals leave the Unviversity of California Press for John Wiley, and Elsevier come bidding for a journal formerly managed by Chicago.  Even Oxford is big enough to act as a poacher, sometimes bidding for the publications handled by the smaller presses.  Thus the journals segment for university presses (always excepting Oxford and Cambridge) is a less reliable source of income today than it was even a few years ago.  Barring a bold new strategy for journals, it is difficult to make a case for growth for any but the largest publishers.

3. Books. What university presses mostly do is publish books. They publish outstanding books and they publish them well.  While the book segment is still primarily a print business (about 90 percent), electronic revenue is growing rapidly. There are no presses to my knowledge that are not now publishing ebooks. This is a growth segment, and the presses are understandably proud of it.

Unfortunately, the book business, whether for print or digital works, is a tough one, especially in a segment where some titles may sell as few as 300 copies and a sale of 10,000 copies is a matter of astonishment. The fixed costs of book publishing are simply too high for the small market for scholarly books, and the introduction of ebooks does nothing to whittle away at those fixed costs. Many presses lose money on the sale of books, which in turn puts more pressure to find revenue in the already challenged segments of journals and services.

Another problem for the presses’ foray into ebooks is the dominance of Amazon, which exacts a significant toll from the presses for distribution. Amazon gets more powerful every day and the demands made on tiny scholarly publishers are becoming strident.  A dollar taken from the operating margin of a university press is handed over to the shareholders of Amazon, a trend that shows no sign of slowing down. While exceptional editorial talent always finds a way to punch its way through a hostile distribution environment, not all editorial work is exceptional and the energy behind every punch has a cost.  Ebooks, in other words, are a good and necessary move for the university press world, but they are not likely by themselves to provide financial stability.

And so all three legs of the three-legged stool are rickety, making the prospects for university press publishing not particularly bright. On the other hand, the prospects are not bleak; the presses continue to earn the bulk of their income from the marketplace (over 90 percent of press budgets are covered by earned income). This contradicts the prevailing narrative, which suggests that university press publishing is doomed, that the presses are losing tons of money, and that only a radical overhaul of the business model can “save” university press publishing. This very point was made to me by a university librarian, who noted that her institution’s press had lost several hundred thousand dollars in the prior year.  Good lord, what are we to do? But contrast this with the librarian’s own budget, which entailed a cost to the university of over $30 million.  People, some perspective, please! This bringd us back to the point that presses are set up as subsidized profit centers, whereas most university functions are set up as cost centers. Which is the bigger burden to the parent institution, the small subsidy of a profit center or the large budget of a cost center?

Using a yardstick of 4 years -- or 6, or 10 -- we would have to say that the presses’ overall situation has gotten tighter; and we would conclude that the “promise” of e-books (though here again I have to ask who is making these promises) has not meaningfully changed the fortunes of the university press world. This is because electronics are not a strategy; electronics are an enabling technology that has to be put in service to a strategy. If we want to meet Clifford Lynch’s challenge, let’s stand up in front of the whiteboard and do some serious thinking.

Joseph Esposito is a management consultant in the world of digital media, software and publishing. This post first appeared in the Scholarly Kitchen.

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