The case of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, which will be argued before the Supreme Court today, is one of the most important debates about student rights at public colleges. The Christian Legal Society (CLS) is suing the University of California's Hastings College of Law because the group claims a religious exemption from the college's nondiscrimination rules.
At first glance, it may seem appealing to allow religious student groups to set religious rules for their leaders. But the practical effect of embracing religious oaths for student groups is a violation of individual rights, an attack on student democracy, and a potential increase in administrative power.
This dispute has its roots in the mid-1990s, when fundamentalist groups such as CLS sought to expand their influence on college campuses but feared that Christian students were becoming too tolerant of homosexuality. In 2004, CLS compelled all of its student chapters to adopt a strict Statement of Faith and standards of sexual morality for leaders, which led to the current litigation.
The First Amendment's rights to free association and free expression are paramount in particular at an institution of higher education. However, the Supreme Court has never ruled that student groups at public colleges must be given special rights due to their religious orthodoxy, and can ignore the universal rules applied to all student groups in a viewpoint-neutral manner.
Religious groups must have the freedom to express their views, even repulsive ones like homophobia. No one at Hastings ever tried to punish anyone for being in the CLS, or barred them from promoting their views. But when the society and other fundamentalist groups demand that universities violate antidiscrimination policies and the individual First Amendment rights of their students to accommodate this bigotry, they go too far.
Who Becomes the Enforcer?
Investigating the religious beliefs, moral values, and sexual activities of students is not something that any university should be doing. But if student groups are allowed to impose ideological oaths and religious tests for membership or leadership, universities are placed in impossible situations where such inquiries will be made in their names.
The CLS defenders, which include a vast group of 22 amici briefs and 14 state attorneys general, are wrong when they cite the Supreme Court precedents for a “right to exclude.” These cases, such as Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, deal exclusively with private organizations, a term that cannot apply to student groups at public colleges, which operate under the umbrella of public colleges -- receiving their funds and using their facilities.
This legal status is important because it means that there is no entity other than the administration that can adjudicate disputes over the meaning of a student group's bylaws. This ownership issue creates a fatal flaw in the CLS argument. Suppose the Supreme Court decides in favor of CLS and it receives recognition at your public college, and then it tries to kick out a member for being gay. Now think about what would occur if that student denies being gay. Do you want a public college – or a student organization acting in the college's name -- deciding whether a student is gay or not? Or whether he is a good Christian?
It is noteworthy that the plaintiffs' brief and the 22 briefs supporting it omit any discussion of exactly who shall be given the power to interpret and enforce the bylaws they deem essential to the existence of CLS at Hastings. But in such scenarios, student organizations or, in an extreme case, a college itself would be making such decisions.
The danger is even greater in this case because of the strict restrictions demanded by CLS. In order to be officers or voting members of CLS, students must sign the national CLS Statement of Faith: “Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in: One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth. The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God’s only Son, conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which we receive eternal life; His bodily resurrection and personal return. The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration. The Bible as the inspired Word of God.” Virtually all of these statements present interpretative challenges. Does defining God as “maker of heaven and earth” require a belief in creationism over evolution? What does it mean to say that the Bible is “the inspired Word of God”?
But the Statement of Faith is not the only requirement for CLS leaders. The bylaws require that “Officers must exemplify the highest standards of morality as set forth in Scripture” in order “that their profession of Christian faith is credible” and must abstain from “ 'acts of the sinful nature,’ including those in Galatians 5:19-21; Exodus 20; Matthew 15:19; Romans 1:27; 1 Corinthians 6:9-10.” Envy, rage, hatred, jealousy, selfish ambitions, discord, dissensions, factions, drunkenness, greed, coveting, slander, evil thoughts, and violating the Sabbath are all prohibited by these Biblical passages.
Imagine for a minute that the CLS believes that a member was violating the statement by believing in witchcraft. She denies it. Could CLS demand that Hastings hold a witchcraft hearing?
Imagine if the leaders of a Christian Legal Society are irritating administrators with public protests against abortion rights. These administrators could retaliate by removing the student leaders for violating their own statement of faith, by accusing them of being “angry,” which is contrary to the CLS bylaws. It would be simple to accuse the leaders of some religious heresy, put them through an ideological trial, arbitrarily decree them guilty, and then remove them. So allowing religious tests in the bylaws of student groups actually increases the threat of administrative abuse because it gives the administration the power to determine the leadership of student groups. Administrators at public colleges will certainly try not to get involved in theological debates, but individual students could file complaints that CLS leaders have felt envy or violated the Sabbath, and demand that administrators (or courts) remove them from office.
CLS and its supporters argues that the university’s rules could force it to accept members who disagree with its mission. However, that’s essential in order to protect every student group.
It may seem strange, at first, to say that an organization might be compelled to accept leaders who appear to contradict its goals. But the phrase “compelled to accept” is inaccurate. The real meaning of an “all-comers” policy is that students are “free to elect.” No student organization at Hastings is compelled by the administration to accept anyone as their leader, because the administration does not pick the leaders. The members of expressive organizations are completely free to make belief-based choices in choosing their leaders.
The CLS brief claims that under an “all-comers” policy, “it would make it impossible to have … a vegetarian club (whose menus could be voted upon by carnivores)…” A vegetarian club can exist with carnivore members, and it should not ban meat-eaters in its bylaws. If it did, exactly what would that mean? Would a person who accidentally ingested meat be banned from the group? Can you eat a steak dinner every week but repent before dessert and become a vegetarian again? Could a vegan proclaim that non-vegan vegetarians are actually meat-eaters? Of course, these are all legitimate arguments for a vegetarian club to undertake when electing its leaders. However, by creating a constitutional ban on meat-eaters in its bylaws that overrules the democratic will of its members, the vegetarian club would require the administration (presumably a bunch of carnivores) to make the decisions about the core meaning of vegetarianism, decisions that instead should be made by the student members.
What CLS demands in this case is that administrators overrule student decisions about selecting their leaders. According to the Petitioners, “CLS is vulnerable to sabotage or takeover by a relative handful of hostile fellow students, who need only show up at a meeting en masse and exercise their rights to join and vote.”(Petitioner's Brief at 33) But hostile takeovers of student organizations are extraordinarily rare on public college campuses. There is not a single recorded case in American history where a roving gang of campus atheists have taken over a religious student group. The plaintiff's brief and all 22 briefs of amici curiae supporting the plaintiffs combined identify only two allegations of a campus group hijacking. In a 1993 case at the University of Nebraska, the College Republicans attempted to take over the Young Democrats, but there is no evidence in the record that they were successful. In a 2007 incident at Central Michigan University, a student on a Facebook page suggested (but apparently never took any action toward) a hostile takeover of a student organization.
The Supreme Court must not impose a remedy for a problem that, according to the written record of this case, does not appear to exist.
The nondiscrimination rules required by Hastings do not limit the Constitutional rights of CLS students. These rules protect the rights of these students by allowing members to select their leaders without interference from national organizations.
The demands of CLS run the risk of creating enormous governmental intervention and control over the religious views of students, a power that Hastings does not wish to have, and a power that it cannot constitutionally exercise. If the administrators of a public college evaluate the religious views of students and make theological decisions, they would be guilty of violating the long-established separation of church and state as well as the freedom of religious expression of students. For a public university to enforce the demands of external religious groups to restrict the rights of conscience of individual students is a clear violation of the First Amendment.
(This essay has been updated to reflect an amended version of the referenced court case at the University of Florida.)
As is always the case in important Supreme Court decisions, the framework chosen determines the result, and Christian Legal Society v. Martinez falls squarely within that tradition. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion cites Healy v. James (1972), Widmar v. Vincent (1981); and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995), cases that have restrained public colleges from discriminating against their student organizations due to the groups’ viewpoints. Reflecting their times, these three cases involved groups that perceived themselves as outliers: Healy involved the radical 1960s group Students for a Democratic Society, while Widmar and Rosenberger involved Christian student organizations, stealing a march on the earlier progressive student litigation.
The majority held that the exact issue was whether or not CLS could exclude members who did not conform to the group’s core beliefs: “In the view of petitioner Christian Legal Society (CLS), an accept-all-comers policy impairs its First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion by prompting it, on pain of relinquishing the advantages of recognition, to accept members who do not share the organization’s core beliefs about religion and sexual orientation. From the perspective of respondent Hastings College of the Law, CLS seeks special dispensation from an across the-board open-access requirement designed to further the reasonable educational purposes underpinning the school’s student-organization program. In accord with the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we reject CLS’s First Amendment challenge. Compliance with Hastings’ all-comers policy, we conclude, is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student-organization forum. In requiring CLS -- in common with all other student organizations -- to choose between welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of official recognition, we hold, Hastings did not transgress constitutional limitations. CLS, it bears emphasis, seeks not parity with other organizations, but a preferential exemption from Hastings’ policy. The First Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization’s expressive activity, however exclusionary that activity may be. But CLS enjoys no constitutional right to state subvention of its selectivity.”
Framing the issue this way, the majority held that the central question was: “May a public law school condition its official recognition of a student group -- and the attendant use of school funds and facilities -- on the organization’s agreement to open eligibility for membership and leadership to all students?” They answered “Yes.”
In the dissent, Justice Alito instead relies upon Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court’s 2000 decision that allowed the Boy Scouts to exclude gays from its leadership ranks. He then parses the complex and incomplete record to find that Hastings engaged in discrimination when it denied full recognition to CLS due to the group’s bylaws, which require members and officers to sign a “Statement of Faith” and to conduct their lives in accord with prescribed principles; these include the belief that sexual activity should not occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman. The national CLS interprets its bylaws to exclude from affiliation anyone who engages in “unrepentant homosexual conduct” or any students who hold religious convictions different from those in the Statement of Faith. Their “Statement of Faith” provides: “Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in: One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit; God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God’s only Son conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which we receive eternal life; His bodily resurrection and personal return; The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration. The Bible as the inspired Word of God.”
Justice Alito suggests that student groups with political, ethnic, or other viewpoints would not be allowed to discriminate in their membership choices, but that religious student organization should be allowed to do so, citing Dale: “It bears emphasis that permitting religious groups to limit membership to those who share the groups’ beliefs would not have the effect of allowing other groups to discriminate on the basis of religion. It would not mean, for example, that fraternities or sororities could exclude students on that basis. As our cases have recognized, the right of expressive association permits a group to exclude an applicant for membership only if the admission of that person would ‘affec[t] in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.’ Groups that do not engage in expressive association have no such right. Similarly, groups that are dedicated to expressing a viewpoint on a secular topic (for example, a political or ideological viewpoint) would have no basis for limiting membership based on religion because the presence of members with diverse religious beliefs would have no effect on the group’s ability to express its views. But for religious groups, the situation is very different.”
It surely is a very different situation. And the Religious Right has systematically sought for many years, including their efforts in Widmar and Rosenberger, to seek full public funding and special pleading with regard to student organizations, no longer accepting that they should render unto Caesar. They have appropriated earlier iconic liberal decisions to advance their interests. While not all religious organizations advance the same interests or adhere to the same litigation tactics, it is clear that there is a deliberate strategy employing careful, incremental, deliberate choices of which cases to bring to the court, by way of geographic and other political choices.
CLS is one example, following on a 2005 Seventh Circuit case, CLS v. Walker, in which the organization prevailed on its free expression and free association rights claims. Another such case is Beta Upsilon Chi Upsilon [BYX] Chapter v. Machen, a student organization recognition case in federal court, before the Northern District of Florida and then the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit. In this case, the University of Florida, which had over 750 Registered Student Organizations (RSO), including 60 religious groups, of which 48 were Christian, denied recognition to BYX, a national Christian fraternity, under Florida’s non-discriminatory regulations, which bar groups from bias on the basis of race, creed, color, religion, age, disability, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, political opinions or affiliations, or veteran status.
Because BYX had a membership requirement that could not qualify under the university’s guidelines, it was not deemed to be eligible for RSO status. The Court found: “BYX is a national fraternity founded in 1985. It has twenty-two chapters in nine states. According to its constitution, it ‘exists for the purpose of establishing brotherhood and unity among college men based on the common bond of Jesus Christ.’ BYX espouses a strict approach to the Christian faith, and membership in the fraternity is contingent upon what the fraternity deems ‘a credible profession of faith in Jesus Christ.’ This requires agreement not only with the traditional core Christian beliefs and values contained in such ancient expressions as the Nicene Creed, but adherence to a demanding view of the faith. In its doctrinal statement, BYX explains that members must ‘believe that the Bible is God's written revelation to man, that it is inspired, authoritative, and without error in the original manuscripts.’ Accordingly, “BYX considers Mormons and Seventh Day Adventists non-Christians.” BYX also demands moral and ‘sexual purity.’ According to its code of conduct, BYX believes that “sex is a gift of God to be enjoyed inside the covenant of marriage between a man and a woman. Therefore, we will not condone such activity as homosexuality, fornication, or adultery.”
The university, rather than risk protracted litigation, capitulated after the appeals court’s oral arguments had been heard, and modified its policy to allow a religious exception: “A student organization whose primary purpose is religious will not be denied registration as a Registered Student Organization on the ground that it limits membership or leadership positions to students who share the religious beliefs of the organization. The University has determined that this accommodation of religious belief does not violate its nondiscrimination policy.” By the new policy, agreed to in wake of the litigation, BYX was allowed all the benefits it had sought, and was treated as all the university’s RSOs.
But the fraternity was not mollified by its victory, contending that the University of Florida, a state institution, had done the right thing, but for the wrong reasons. The appeals court noted: “BYX is not satisfied with this result, however, and urges us to reach the merits of its constitutional claims. It ardently presses us to retain jurisdiction over this case because the University has failed to change the regulation from which the CSAI Handbook nondiscrimination policy derived: UF Regulation 6C1-1.006(1) (the “Regulation”). Furthermore, BYX is troubled by UF's timing. It contends that ‘the timing of [UF's] motion to dismiss [this appeal] indicates that it is motivated not by a genuine change of heart but rather by a desire to avoid liability.’ We are not concerned with UF's motivation for changing its registration policy, but only with whether a justiciable controversy exists. Finding that BYX has received the relief sought in its complaint, we reject its request that we reach its constitutional claims and dismiss this case, as we no longer possess jurisdiction.”
Thurgood Marshall may well have wished that the University of Texas in 1950 had behaved better and that the LDF had not been required to spend precious resources bringing Sweatt v. Painterto have its client admitted into the real University of Texas Law School, not the inferior makeshift version that the State had offered in the alternative. But once he won the case and Heman Sweatt was admitted, he did not go back to the courts to ensure that UT do so with a better attitude or “genuine change of heart.” This extraordinary line of reasoning, even when religious groups had prevailed on the merits of the case in federal court, shows the extent to which they are on a jihad and will settle for no less than winning hearts and minds, but only according to their own, narrow terms. The LDF would never have litigated that Homer Plessy was not fully Black and therefore on this basis was entitled to sit in New Orleans public transportation’s Whites-Only sections, nor would it have reasoned that Colin Powell was not African American for affirmative action purposes, because his people were from the Caribbean rather than from Africa. It surely will come as a shock to members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints or others who consider themselves to be Christian that a “Christian” fraternity has expelled them from Eden and deemed them ineligible for CLS or BYX membership. And it begs the troubling question of who is entitled to trademark Christianity or to dictate who is a Christian or “morally pure.”
On the remand of the case to the Ninth Circuit, the Court seeks to determine whether UC-Hastings had actually followed its own rules in enforcing the “all-comers” policy. In this remand, I hope that the lower court will review the complex and confusing record and find that Hastings acted consistently and in good faith. I also hope all the feckless colleges that capitulated earlier will go back and restore the full anti-discrimination provisions they silently set aside. I had bet a dinner that the Supreme Court would “DIG” the case, dismissing it as improvidently granted for consideration. I also bet a different dinner that the Court would decide for the law school on a 5-4 basis. This is one meal I expect to relish.
Michael A. Olivas
Michael A. Olivas is William B. Bates Distinguished Chair in Law at the University of Houston, and the author of the forthcoming Suing Alma Mater: Higher Education and the Courts.
There probably weren’t any Supreme Court justices marching in the pride marches of recent weeks. But they did give gay people a nod last Monday. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Supreme Court upheld a University of California Hastings College of Law rule prohibiting registered student organizations from excluding anyone, in this case, lesbians and gays. The Christian Legals contended that their religion forbade them to associate with people who engaged in “unrepentant homosexual conduct,” and that the law school rule violated their religious freedom in demanding open membership.
The opinion, by Justice Ginsburg, is hardly a paean to gay rights – it carefully notes that the world of registered student organizations is a “limited access public forum,” not a full public forum like a town square. A limited public forum, which carries with it benefits, is treated somewhat more like the public funding cases. People may have rights, as the Christian Legal Society claimed, not to associate, which would protect them, for example, from a law forcing them to take gay members, but they do not have rights not to associate and to still claim money and recognition from the University of California. Certainly nothing in the opinion indicates that gays and lesbians are a specially protected class such that an organization funded by the state university excluding them particularly would violate the 14th Amendment. All this opinion does is turn back the claim that religious beliefs trump all other legal claims, including the university’s rules of inclusiveness.
The opinion is noteworthy not just for what it says about public colleges and their student organizations, but also for what it may suggest about Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the constitutional challenge to California’s Prop 8, rejecting gay marriage, as it ever so slowly wends its way to the Supreme arbiters. First, the 5-4 decisions in the Hastings case was that rarest of birds, a collection of the Court’s four liberals plus the gays’ best hope: Justice Anthony Kennedy. If the case against Prop 8 has any chance in the Supreme Court as likely configured, it rests in Justice Kennedy, who wrote the opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, the 2003 case striking down the sodomy laws as unconstitutional.
Second, Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion, concurring in the opinion of the Court, is a pretty stirring argument for the Prop 8 plaintiffs coming up from California. Justice Kennedy takes time to write separately, even though he explicitly says he only speaks to support the opinion of the Court, because he wants to say a word in defense of the special role of reason in a legal system:
“Law students come from many backgrounds and have but three years to meet each other and develop their skills. They do so by participating in a community that teaches them how to create arguments in a convincing, rational, and respectful manner.... As a condition to membership or participation in a group, students were required to avow particular personal beliefs or to disclose private, off-campus behavior ... were those sorts of requirements to become prevalent, it might undermine the principle that in a university community — and in a law school community specifically — speech is deemed persuasive based on its substance.... A school quite properly may conclude that allowing an oath or belief-affirming requirement, or an outside conduct requirement, could be ... inconsistent with the basic concept that a view’s validity should be tested through free and open discussion.”
By all reports, the strongest thing the plaintiffs in Perry have going for them, beside the obvious talents of their lawyers, David Boies and Ted Olson, is the power of rational argument. To be constitutional, legislation has to have some basis in reason. Since the defendants, cleverly or foolishly, chose to limit the presentation of evidence in Perry essentially to one dubious expert, they were forced, by closing argument, to contend, simply, that Prop 8 is constitutional, because the groundless fears of a majority of the referendum voters constitutes a rational basis for legislation. This position differs radically from the arguments that the Prop 8 proponents presented in the campaign for Prop 8, which included the damage to society by treating gay and lesbian people as normal and worthy. It even differs from the defendants’ original attempts, at trial, to present evidence that the option of same sex marriage actually harms heterosexual marriage. In essence, the Prop 8 defendants are arguing that they do not have to make a substantive, rational argument for their law.
By forcing them into a court of law, the plaintiffs challenged not so much the substance of Prop 8 as its metaphysics: What counts as reason? Inchoate fears may be the currency of political campaigns, sadly. But Justice Kennedy’s opinion reminds us that they are emphatically not the stuff of the American legal system, starting with the three years in which its practitioners learn their skills. If he means what he said, this rare bird may also be the first swallow.
Linda Hirshman is at work on a book on the gay revolution, "Victory! How a Despised and Marginalized Minority Came Out, Pushed Back, Faced Death, Found Love and Changed America for Everyone," to be published in 2011.
As an association representing institutions of higher learning, the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities is sensitive to the claims of institutional autonomy presented by the Hastings College of the Law in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. However, as the institutions within our organization are religious in nature, we are also acutely aware of the religious freedom concerns presented by this case. Ultimately, because this decision did not determine the constitutionality of the more common "non-discrimination clauses," its limited scope is such that this ruling has little broad applicability beyond "all-comers policies" at public universities, and in many ways leaves more questions than it answers. As higher education works to understand the implications of this limited decision, and formulate policies in light of it, the academy must wonder whether all-comers policies -- in which public colleges limit recognition to student groups that will allow any and all students to join and run for office -- though deemed constitutional, really help further the laudable goal espoused by Justice Anthony Kennedy of "enabling [students] to explore new points of view."
In his concurrence Justice Kennedy observes that "vibrant dialogue is not possible if students wall themselves off from opposing points of view." But one might ask how a vibrant dialogue is possible if opposing points of view are not present. Here, Hastings argued that CLS built the wall by excluding members who would not sign its statement of faith. Did Hastings itself, however, not build a wall by rejecting CLS as a student organization? CLS had a version of an all-comers policy, allowing attendance and participation by non-members, requiring the statement of faith only for members and leaders. Would not vibrant dialogue have occurred more readily on campus during club meetings, between members with one point of view and non-members with different points of view, than by rejecting CLS? Further, this analysis ignores the reality that vibrant dialogue occurs within groups of like-minded people – the vigorous debates within political parties clearly demonstrate this. And at a macro level, had CLS remained a student organization, perhaps another Christian group with different beliefs would have formed, creating vibrant dialogue between these two groups.
It is easy to mischaracterize CLS’s membership policy and to oversimplify it as outright discrimination, but a more nuanced approach might be more useful to the academy as it moves forward in applying this case. In Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, a central case to the bounds of religious association, the then-leader of the liberal wing of the Court, Justice William J. Brennan, explained that a religious community defines itself by "determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization’s religious mission, and that only those committed to that mission should conduct them, is ... a means by which a religious community defines itself." And this Court itself reaffirmed the constitutionality of CLS’s expressive activity, "[i]nsisting that an organization embrace unwelcome members we have therefore concluded, 'directly and immediately affects associational rights.' " Preventing discrimination on campuses is a worthy goal, but reflexively applying the hatchet of an all-comers policy may actually undermine equally worthy goals: free speech, freedom of association, and an open marketplace of ideas. Might public colleges and universities instead formulate more nuanced policies that take care to ask whether a group’s belief-based membership requirements are "in furtherance of [the] organization’s religious mission," instead of simply rejecting these groups outright?
A key tenet of almost all religions is that they hold beliefs distinct from other religions and the non-religious -- communal beliefs are essential to the religious. Religion has often been challenged to define these beliefs in the face of cultural shifts, but it is the prerogative of those within the religion to determine those boundaries. And as mystifying or even offensive as some of those ideas are to those outside (or even inside) that religion, a key principle of our American ideals is that those ideas be challenged not rejected.
Within the CCCU itself this case sparked debate – debate which we welcomed as a sign of a healthy and robust organization. Such debate is part of the fabric of academe. If in an effort to limit liability more public and colleges and universities adopt these all-comers policies, part of that fabric could be undone. Though they claim to promote diversity, they actually promote sameness. How can a robust marketplace of diverse ideas exist when no group is allowed to unite around a core set of unique beliefs that give them their identity?
Academia has long stood for a free and open expression of ideas, undergirded by the expectation that the best ones will ultimately rise to the top. Rather than merely “tolerat[ing]” unpopular viewpoints, as Justice Stevens suggests, public colleges and universities should engage them. As Thomas Jefferson said, referencing the University of Virginia, “This institution will be based upon the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it."
Shapri D. LoMaglio
Shapri D. LoMaglio is government relations and executive programs director of the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities.
A week after being admonished in court for a procedural error that may have warranted a mistrial, the National Collegiate Athletic Association announced Monday that it would bear the brunt of settling a lawsuit filed last year by Rick Neuheisel, former football coach at the University of Washington. The settlement, worth a total of $4.5 million, came as closing arguments were due to begin in a five-week jury trial.
A foundation created by Western Kentucky University to manage its dormitories does not have the university's immunity from lawsuits, a Kentucky appeals court ruled Friday.
The ruling sends a lawsuit against the foundation back to a lower court for additional hearings, and the ruling could complicate the arrangements some public colleges have set up with foundations or related entities to manage some of their operations.